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AMNESTY IN THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
CONTROL ACT OF 1986: POLICY RATIONALE AND
LESSONS FROM CANADA
Juan P. Osuna*
INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 1 This landmark legislation contains two key provisions: employer sanctions2 and legaliza* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. This Comment went to print in March 1988, two months before the end of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act's amnesty application deadline. Accordingly, the
reader should not view this Comment as a review of the entire amnesty program. Instead, the Comment is meant to be an overview of the amnesty law, a description of the
lessons that the Canadian amnesty program provided, and a "progress report" of the
yearlong United States amnesty program, two months before its completion.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCA]; PresidentSigns
Simpson-Rodino Bill, 63 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 1029 (Nov. 10, 1986). The
Senate passed IRCA on October 17, 1986 by a vote of 63 to 24. Pear, Immigration
Bill Approved; Bars Hiring Illegal Aliens, but Gives Millions Amnesty, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The House of Representatives passed the bill on October
15 by a vote of 238 to 173. Id. IRCA is the most comprehensive change in the immigration laws of the United States since 1952. N. MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION
REFORM LAW OF 1986 3 (1987).
Earlier versions of the bill that eventually became IRCA were known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, named for its sponsors, Senator Alan Simpson and Representative
Romano Mazzoli. Martin & Houstoun, European and American Immigration Policies,
in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 51 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984) [hereinafter U.S. IMMIORATION POLICY]. In 1982 and 1983, the Senate passed versions of the bill, but the House
failed to act. M. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION - THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 2
(1985). In June 1984 the bill passed both Houses of Congress but died in the final days
of the Ninety-eighth Congress when a House-Senate conference failed to agree on a
single version. Id. at 2-3. Morris points out that because such a controversial measure
came so close to fruition in an election year it would only be a matter of time before
the bill became law. Id. at 3; see also CONG. REC. S7039 (daily ed. May 23, 1985)
(statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson) (stating that the framework of previous proposals
represents the most desireable type of immigration reform).
IRCA, also called the Simpson-Rodino Act, was incorporated into the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), the basic immigration law of the United States. For the
sake of clarity this Comment cites principally to the INA.
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 101-03,
100 Stat. 3359, 3360-80 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The employer
sanctions provision makes it illegal for an employer knowingly to hire undocumented
aliens. Id. § 101(a)(1); see Note, The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill: Employer Sanctions and
ImmigrationReform, 17 N.Y.U.J. lrNr'L L. & POL. 987, 998-1022 (1985) [hereinafter
Employer Sanctions] (explaining the concept of employer sanctions in immigration re-
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tion, or amnesty, of undocumented aliens.3 In their final form, these
provisions represent a compromise of years of debate and controversy.4
This Comment analyzes the amnesty provision in IRCA.
IRCA is a response to the growing problem of illegal immigration in
the United States. 5 Although general awareness of the problem existed
for years, illegal immigration did not become an urgent national issue
until the 1970s.6 In 1986, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) 7 reported that apprehensions of undocumented aliens 8 reached
form efforts); see also Smith, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: A
Commentary and Overview, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 211, 212-24 (1987) (discussing the
employer sanctions provision in IRCA).
3. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 201-04,
100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3411 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The amnesty
provision essentially legalizes the status of undocumented aliens who arrived before
January 1, 1982 and have remained in the United States. Id. § 201(a)(2); United
States Legislation Concerning Immigration, 26 I.L.M. 479, 480 (1987) [hereinafter
United States Legislation ConcerningImmigration]; see infra notes 129-72 and accompanying text (detailing the specifics of the amnesty provision); see also Pear, supra
note 1, at Al, col. 6 (reporting the approval of IRCA and briefly describing the amnesty provision).
The purpose of IRCA is to "control illegal immigration to the United States, make
limited changes in the system for legal immigration, and provide a controlled legalization program for certain undocumented aliens." H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1986). In effect, the employer sanctions provision is the "stick" and
the legalization provision is the "carrot." Applebome, Amnesty Program for Illegal
Aliens Gaining Momentum, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
In addition, IRCA grants amnesty to certain "special agricultural workers" (SAWs).
Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 210, 210A, 8 U.S.C. §§
ll01(a)(15)(H)(ii), 1160, 1161a (Supp. IV 1986). This provision, which contains
many of the same requirements as the main legalization program, applies to aliens who
have performed 90 days of seasonal agricultural work during the twelve month period
ending on May 1, 1986. Id. § 210(a)(1)(B); see Immigration Bill-Special Agricultural
Workers, Federal Practice Advisory, (Law. Coop. & Bancroft Whitney) 6 (Jan. 12,
1986) (stating that the SAW program is a legalization program).
Because the SAW program merits an extensive discussion in and of itself, this Comment will only discuss the main legalization program.
The terms "amnesty" and "legalization" are synonymous and are used interchangeably in this Comment.
4. See Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 433,
433 (1983) (stating that because immigration is an emotional issue, comprehensive reform of immigration policy occurs infrequently); see also D. REIMERS, STILL THE
GOLDEN DOOR, THE THIRD WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 234-40 (1985) (discussing the
controversial nature of the years of debate over various immigration reform bills in
Congress).
5. 131 CONG. REC. S11,258 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1985) (statement of Sen. Alan K.
Simpson). Senator Simpson makes the point that IRCA is a response to the rapidly
increasing problem of illegal immigration. Id.; see United States Legislation Concerning Immigration, supra note 3, at 479 (stating that IRCA is an effort to control illegal
immigration in the United States).
6. Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States,
1970-1981, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 1, at 223.
7. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Jus-
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an all-time record, iuggesting that the number of undocumented aliens
residing in the country was larger than ever before."
Several alternative solutions were available to control illegal immigration. 10 Congress, however, chose a generous amnesty program to legalize the status of millions of aliens. Before the late 1970s, the United
States government had never employed amnesty to address immigration problems.11 The controversial nature of legalizing the status of millions of people illegally present in the country accounted for much of
this reluctance.1 Despite this controversy, Congress viewed an amnesty
program as the least costly alternative, politically as well as financially
3

and administratively.1

tice is the branch of the United States government most responsible for enforcing and
administering the immigration laws of the United States. See T. ALEINIKOnF & D.
MARTIN, IMMIGRATION, PROCESS AND POLICY 82 (1985) (explaining that the Attorney
General, through the INS, is responsible for administering most of the INA); see also
infra note 99 (discussing the federal agencies that are responsible for the enforcement
of the immigration laws).
8. The term "undocumented alien" refers to an alien who is in the United States in
an unlawful status because he or she entered without inspection (EWI) by the INS or,
in the case of a nonimmigrant visa holder, such as a student, when he or she no longer
has valid documents to remain in the United States. See Immigration and Nationality
Act, § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15) (Supp. IV 1986) (enumerating the types of
nonimmigrant categories); id. § 235 (describing the procedure by which the INS inspects aliens seeking to enter the United States).
The terms "undocumented alien," first used in the Carter administration, and "illegal alien" are synonymous. This Comment uses the former term because many persons
consider the term "illegal alien" derogatory.
9. Enforcement: Dealingwith Illegal Immigration, INS REP. 4 (Fall/Winter 198586) [hereinafter INS REP.]. The number of aliens the INS apprehends are often the
most reliable count because it is difficult to estimate the actual number of undocumented aliens in the United States.
10. See Recent Developments, Legalization of Illegal Aliens: A HumanitarianApproach Long Overdue, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 572, 575-76 (1986) (discussing the shortcomings of deportation efforts to deal with illegal immigration); see also
Employer Sanctions, supra note 2, at 998-1022 (discussing employer sanctions as a
way of stopping illegal immigration).
' 11.

D.

NORTH, AMNESTY: CONFERRING LEGAL STATUS ON ILLEGAL ALIENS

A-5

(1982).
12. See Wilentz, Harvest of Confusion, TIME, Nov. 3, 1986, at 28 (stating that the
amnesty is one of the immigration bill's controversial sections); cf. Is Amnesty for llegals a Sound U.S. Policy?, 56 CONG. DIG. 235, 235 (1977) (statement of Sen. Richard
S. Schweiker), reprinted in CONG. RESEARCH SERV. SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IiMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 177 (1980) [hereinafter SELECTED READINGS] (arguing
that an amnesty rewards lawbreakers). But cf. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 832 (1982) (arguing that failure
of the government to close the "back door" of illegal immigration is attributable to a
number of factors, including a demand for cheap labor, ethnic pressures, foreign policy
and civil rights considerations, and cost concerns); see also infra notes 175-96 and
accompanying text (outlining the arguments in favor of and against amnesty).
13. Note, The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill: Altering the Policy of Neglect of Undocumented Immigrationfrom South of the Border, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347, 363-64 (1983)
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Unlike the United States, Canada has experimented with a broad
amnesty program for aliens. In 1973, the Canadian government enacted an amnesty program that legalized the status of thousands of
aliens." ' Although important differences exist in the immigration situations and policies of the two countries, the Canadian experience with
amnesty provides valuable lessons for the United States.
Part I of this Comment discusses amnesty from a historical perspective, focusing on legislative proposals since the 1970s, the current state
of the illegal immigration problem, and the results of the Canadian
amnesty program. Part II examines amnesty under IRCA, addressing
its specific provisions and INS implementation measures. Part II also
analyzes opposing policy arguments concerning amnesty for undocumented aliens in the United States. Part III discusses the lessons that
the United States can learn from the amnesty program in Canada. Part
IV gives a progress report of the yearlong IRCA amnesty program
three-quarters of the way to its completion. Finally, this Comment discusses how well the United States has learned the lessons from Canada.
I.
A.
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

Background

Historically, United States immigration policy has involved a compromise between two competing principles. First is the notion that the
United States is a "nation of immigrants" that continues to welcome
immigrants and offer them the opportunity to improve their lives."
[hereinafter South of the Border]; see also Buck, The New Sweatshops: A Penny for
Your Collar, N.Y. MAG. 42, 44 (1979), reprinted in SELECTED READINGS, supra note
12, at 36 (describing a 1978 operation in New York where the INS spent $23.6 million
locating 10,607 deportable aliens, a cost of $2,225 for each person). One INS agent,
describing this as "petty harassment," stated, "[w]e will never contain the flood of
illegals now coming to New York; the numbers are just too great." Id. Cf. Keely,
Current Status of U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE POLICY 341-42 (M. Kritz ed. 1983) [hereinafter U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE POLICY] (highlighting government studies indicating the futility, political
costs, and inhumanity of the massive round-up and deportation efforts of the past).
14. Act of July 27, 1973 to amend the Immigration Appeal Board Act, ch. 27,
1973-1974 Can. Stat. 423 (proclaimed in force Aug. 15, 1973); Immigration Adjustment of Status Regulations, 107 Can. Gaz. 11 2069 (Aug. 3, 1973).
15. Note, U.S. Immigration and Refugee Reform: A CriticalEvaluation, 22 VA. J.
INT'L L. 805, 809 (1982) [hereinafter A CriticalEvaluation]; see Maingot, Ideology,
Politics and Citizenship in the American Debate on Immigration Policy: Beyond Consensus, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 13, at 363 (stating
that the immigration problem has a moral dimension because it appeals to the "American Creed").
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Second, practical considerations dictate that controls are necessary to
curtail the detrimental effects of unfettered immigration. 0 The compromise between these two principles, which shaped past policies, continues to affect current efforts to reform United States immigration
laws. 17
Many observers define the roots of illegal immigration, especially

during the 1960s and early 1970s, in terms of a "push-pull" phenomenon.18 This theory holds that negative socioeconomic conditions in developing countries "push" people toward the United States, while opportunities for wealth and prosperity "pull" people into the United
States.19 In the mid-1960s, the Johnson administration's Great Society
The tradition of "open arms" is reflected in Emma Lazarus's words inscribed on the
Statue of Liberty: "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free; the wretched refuse of your teeming shore; send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me; I lift my lamp beside the golden door!" reprinted in MOTHER OF ExILES i (1986). But see P. EHRLICH, THE GOLDEN DOOR 50 (1979) (pointing out that
the label "nation of immigrants" is not really appropriate because historical demographers have calculated that only half of all United States citizens are descendants of
post-1789 immigrants).
16. P. EHRLICH, supra note 15, at 51; see A Critical Evaluation,supra note IS, at
809-13 (mentioning several forms of immigration controls that the United States has
imposed since the Civil War).
Beside imposing numerical controls, the United States has also historically restricted
the immigration of certain classes of aliens, including alcoholics, vagrants, prostitutes,
and insane persons. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. The immigration laws also excluded Chinese workers at one time. Chinese Exclusion Act of May
6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. See generally E. HARPER & R. CHASE, IMMIGRATION
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 3-48 (3d ed. 1975) (listing and briefly discussing laws
that control immigration).
17. See Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. PIrr. L. REV. 447,
461 (1983) (stating that recommendations for an "open society" do not imply a "totally open society"); Zall, Asylum and Sanctuary: The American Dilemma, 72 A.B.A.
J. 66, 66 (1986) (explaining the dilemma as the conflict between the desire to continue
the immigrant tradition and the ability of the United States to fulfill that desire); see
also United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that the existence of the United States depends on its ability to respond to the needs of
aliens and at the same time to cope with the realities of an expanding population);
SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT, U.S.

5 (1981) (stating that although
immigration is in the national interest of the United States, there are limits on the
number of immigrants that the country can absorb).
18. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 63.
19. Id. The "push-pull" model is not limited to economic factors alone. Id. This
model also considers other factors, such as the political instability in certain developing
countries that "pushes" people out, while the "pull" of the United States political climate brings them into the United States. Id. at 63-77; see Pastor, Migration in the
CaribbeanBasin: The Need for an Approach as Dynamic as the Phenomenon, in U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 13, at 101 (dividing "push" factors
into three broad catagories: social and demographic trends, including population
growth and urbanization; economic development and employment; and political
currents).
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
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program, 0 which enhanced this "pull" phenomenon, coincided with the
lapse of the Mexican contract labor program by which thousands of
Mexicans had legally entered the United States."' This combination of
push and pull factors significantly contributed to increasing the number
of undocumented aliens entering the United States.
Although the socioeconomic realities of the United States and developing countries are the principal reasons for the large numbers of
aliens entering the United States, political strife has also been a major
cause of immigration.22 Most of the immigrants who left Southeast
Asia in the 1970s, for example, fled from war and oppression in their
native countries. 23 The United States admitted most of these persons as
refugees.24 In the 1980s, many persons fled from parts of Central
20. See D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 220-21 (1976)
(describing the Great Society as focusing on programs for the relief of poverty, help to
education, and other measures for the just distribution of rising abundance).
21. Corwin, supra note 6, at 224-25. One of the effects of the demise of the Mexican program was that it encouraged employers in the United States to turn to undocumented aliens from Mexico and other countries as a source of labor. Id.
The Mexican contract labor program, known as the Bracero program, consisted of
an agreement with Mexico under which the United States admitted Mexican laborers
into the country for seasonal employment in agriculture. Agreement Respecting Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, Aug. 4, 1942, United States-Mexico, 56 Stat. 1759, E.A.S. No. 278.
22. Hofstetter, Economic Underdevelopment and the PopulationExplosion: Implications for U.S. Immigration Policy, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 1, at
63-64. Mexico provides a useful comparison because it is a close neighbor and provides
the largest source of immigrants. Id.; see Passel, Estimating the Number of Undocumented Aliens, Monthly Lab. Rev., at 33 (Sept. 1986) (estimating that 55% of the
undocumented aliens in 1980 were Mexican).
Throughout much of the 1970s, the economy of Mexico was in decline and the country faced a population explosion and a serious trade deficit with the United States.
Corwin, supra note 6, at 259; see also Hofstetter, supra, at 63 (discussing statistics
predicting that the population of Mexico will increase eightfold in this century). An
open border, which thousands of people could easily cross acts as a "safety valve" for
Mexico to relieve the pressures that its socioeconomic problems have caused. Id. Some
studies indicate that in the 1970s, as a result of adverse economic conditions in their
home countries, approximately three-quarters of the undocumented aliens who came to
the United States came in search of jobs. D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY S-4 (1976).

23. See 80 DEP'T ST. BULL. 26-27 (June 1980) (statement of Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) (describing
Indochinese persons arriving in the United States as refugees fleeing from war); Pringle, An Eyewitness to Border Carnage, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1980, at 43 (detailing
the plight of Cambodian refugees fleeing war and repression in their country); J. CERQUONE, USCR ISSUE PAPER, UNCERTAIN HARBORS: THE PLIGHT OF VIETNAMESE
BOAT PEOPLE 4 (1987) (stating that about 660,000 persons are known to have left
Vietnam since 1975).
24. 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 68 (Aug. 1983) (statement of James Purcell, Director of
the State Department's Bureau of Refugee Programs). In 1983, the United States admitted approximately 40,000 persons from Southeast Asia as refugees. Id. This is by
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America, particularly El Salvador, to the United States for political
rather than economic reasons.2 5 Because granting refugee status to
many of these persons, however, presents foreign policy dilemmas for
the United States, most remain in the United States in an unlawful
status.26
Congress first recognized the growing number of undocumented
aliens as a significant national concern in the early 1970s.17 By then,
actual immigration in the United States had exceeded three times its
legal limit.28 In October 1974, the United States Attorney General estifar the largest number of refugees admitted from a single group. Id.; see also
Gwertzman, Policy that Limits Indochina Refugees is Reversed by US., N.Y. Times,
May 31, 1981, at Al, col. 4 (reporting Secretary of State Alexander Haig's statement
that anyone coming from Indochina is a refugee).
25. See J. SILK, USCR ISSUE PAPER, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT. DENYING AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (1986) (stating that political violence and civil war in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua have displaced thousands of persons, many of
whom have made their way to the United States). Silk provides figures estimating that
between 300,000 and 500,000 Salvadorans are presently living in the United States in
an undocumented status. Id.; see also Magnuson, Double Standardfor Refugees?,
TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 34 (reporting the perception that the United States government is unfair because it grants refugee status to many more Nicaraguans than
Salvadorans). Between June 1983 and September 1986, 14% of asylum cases involving
Nicaraguans were approved compared to 2.6% for Salvadorans. J. SILK, supra, at 9;
cf. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1982 at 138 (1982) (pointing out that in 1981
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American
States (OAS) denounced the human rights record of El Salvador).
26. See Posner, Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Reforms to United
States Immigration Policy, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 883, 887 (1982) (stating that United
States admission of Salvadoran refugees would be tantamount to admitting that the
United States-backed government of El Salvador is persecuting Salvadorans); see also
J. SILK, supra note 25, at 7-8 (arguing that United States asylum policies reflect a
double standard); cf. Gordenker, The InternationalSetting of American Refugee Policy, in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE: U.S. IMMIGRATION PoLIcv IN THE 1980's 251, 260
(D. Papademetriou & M. Miller eds. 1983) [hereinafter THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE]
(indicating that the United States government draws a distinction between political and
economic refugees).
27. Corwin, supra note 6, at 223; see Leaf, Legalizing the Illegals: A Case for
Amnesty, 12 COLUM. HuMt. RTs. L. REV. 65, 79 (1980) (pointing out that by the mid1970s, when the level of undocumented aliens in the country became intolerable, the
federal government finally responded to the problem of illegal immigration); see also
Illegal Aliens: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 136 (1975) (statement of Rep. Mario Biaggi) (stating that Congress
cannot ignore the illegal immigration problem any longer).
28. See M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 49-50 (discussing various estimates on the
numbers of undocumented aliens). Between 1971 and 1980, the annual ceiling on immigration stipulated by law totaled 290,000, while actual immigration averaged about
450,000 a year. Id. at 49. The number reached 600,000 in 1978, and was probably as
high as one million a year. Id.; cf. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1 (1982) (showing in a chart that between 1971 and 1980,
over 4.4 million legal immigrants entered the United States, more than any other tenyear period).
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mated that between four and seven million undocumented aliens lived

in the United States, while other reports estimated even higher numbers. 9 A 1981 report estimated that between 7.9 million and 9.9 million undocumented aliens were in the United States.3 0 By 1986, the
most widely accepted figures indicated that between four and six million aliens were living in the country.3 1
2. Amnesty ProposalsBefore IRCA

Although immigration has always been an issue in United States political history,32 amnesty has not. Amnesty is only part of the immigration debate and, prior to the 1970s, was not seriously considered a major policy option. From 1975 to 1986, however, Congress considered
various amnesty proposals designed to regulate the problem of illegal
immigration.
a. The Ford Years

In 1975, President Ford established the Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens (Committee) 33 to develop a comprehensive apIt is important to remember that these figures reflect only legal immigration; they
rise sharply when estimates of illegal immigration are included.
29. Corwin, supra note 6, at 227; see T. KESSNER & B. CAROLI, TODAY'S IMMIGRANTS, THEIR STORIES 21 (1981) (pointing out that in 1975, INS district directors
estimated that more than six million undocumented aliens lived in the United States).
30. Corwin, supra note 6, at 248-50; see also infra note 93 and accompanying text
(reporting estimates of the numbers of undocumented aliens and the regions from
which they originate).
31. Whelan, supra note 17, at 455; Developments in the Law -Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1436 (1983).
The four to six million range is only an estimate and could be even higher. See
Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a Consistent Theory, 16 Hous. L. REV. 667, 667 (1979) [hereinafter The Legal Status] (stating that
the estimates of undocumented aliens in the United States vary from four to twelve
million). The wide discrepancies in the estimates show the difficulty of assessing the
accurate number of undocumented aliens, a difficulty that one observer calls "the morass of estimates." Keely, supra note 13, at 342; see D. REIMERS, supra note 4, at 21415 (describing the frustrating efforts to ascertain the exact number of undocumented
aliens in the 1970s).
INS apprehension numbers reflect the tremendous rise in the numbers of undocumented aliens in the 1970s, when the figures rose from 450,000 in 1970 to 1,076,000 in
1979. Aliens Apprehended, Aliens Deported, and Aliens Required to Depart, Fiscal
Years 1892-1984, in

STATISTICAL

Y.B.

OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION

188 (1984).
32. See Seller, Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: Case
Studies and Current Implications, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 1, at 137
(stating that debates about immigration policy began with the Thirteen Colonies and
continue to the present).
33. Midgley, Comings and Goings in U.S. Immigration Policy, in THE UNAVOIDASERVICE
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proach to resolving the issue of illegal immigration.3 ' The Committee
rejected a massive effort to deport undocumented aliens residing in the
United States as both impractical and inhumane."' Instead, the Committee recommended advancing the eligibility date for admission to
lawful permanent residence for aliens in the United States from June
30, 1948 to July 1, 1968.36 Some critized the proposal as ineffective
because it did not include the large majority of aliens who entered after
1968. 37
President Ford accomplished little progress in the illegal immigration
issue. During his administration, no legislative reforms were proposed
and the recommendations of the Committee received only mixed reviews. By the time President Carter assumed office in 1977, the problem still remained.
b.

The Carter Years
In August 1977, President Carter presented a six-part proposal for

BLE ISSUE, supra note 26, at 53.
34. U.S. DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ILLEGAL AUENS, PREUMINARY REPORT 242-43 (1976) [hereinafter DOMESTIC COUNCIL REPORT). The Committee's

rather simplistic conclusions were the following: (1) immigration is rooted in socioeconomic forces both in the United States and developing countries; (2) illegal immigration is a significant and growing problem; (3) immigration has an impact on the labor
market; (4) effective enforcement is crucial; and (5) the country has to rethink its
immigration policies. Corwin, supra note 6, at 252-54. The Committee recommended
that the administration (1) give priority to the issue of illegal immigration; (2) aggressively pursue legislation; (3) evaluate the temporary worker program in the Immigration and Nationality Act; (4) give high priority in allocating resources to the INS; (5)
develop policies aimed at aliens already within the United States; (6) cooperate with
foreign governments; (7) research immigration problems; and (8) reexamine the operation of current immigration policy. Id. at 255-56.
35. DOMESTIC COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 243.
36. Id. This eligibility date is called the registry. Immigration and Nationality Act,
§ 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (Supp. IV 1986).
A person must have resided in the United States before the registry date to apply for
adjustment to legal status. Id. § 249(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1259(b). Originally set at June 3,
1921, Congress later advanced the registry date to June 28, 1940, and then to June 30,
1948. Leaf, supra note 27, at 81. IRCA advanced the date to January 1, 1972. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 203, 100 Stat. 3359,
3405 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1259).
The registry provision gives the Attorney General the discretion to provide a record
of lawful admission to any alien lacking that record, provided that the alien (I) entered
the United States before January 1, 1972; (2) has continuously resided in the United
States since entry; (3) is of good moral character, and (4) is eligible for citizenship.
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (Supp. IV 1986).
37. See Leaf, supra note 27, at 80 (stating that the Committee failed to address
the critical question of dealing with the overwhelming majority of undocumented aliens
who would be ineligible for relief under the new registry date). Leaf characterized the
work of the Committee on the whole as a "disappointment." Id.
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legislative reform in immigration law. 38 One part constituted an adjustment of status, or amnesty proposal.39 Under this proposal, aliens who
had continuously resided in the United States before January 1, 1970
would be eligible for permanent resident status.40 Those who had entered between January 1, 1970 and January 1, 1977 would be eligible
for "temporary residence" consisting of a special nondeportable status
for five years.41
When Congress first considered the plan in October 1977,42 the ensuing debate illustrated the controversial nature of the amnesty. Conservative members of Congress criticized the proposed amnesty for rewarding lawbreakers and thereby condoning disrespect for law.43
Liberals, fearing that the continued existence of a large underground
class of people would negate the goals of the legislation, argued for a
more generous amnesty with a more recent cutoff date.44 The Carter
administration proposals received a mixed reception from the public;
one observer characterized them as a "politician's accommodation" to
conflicting pressures.45
38. President's Message to Congress on Undocumented Aliens, 13 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1169 (Aug. 4, 1977) [hereinafter President's Message on Undocumented
Aliens]. The six-part proposal included legislative reform proposals on amnesty, employer sanctions, increased border enforcement, cooperation with other countries, review of the temporary foreign worker program, and a comprehensive review of United
States immigration policy. Id.
President Carter stated that although the aliens had violated the immigration laws
by illegally entering and willfully remaining in the United States, many were law-abiding residents and productive members of society. Id.
39. Id.; D. REIMERS, supra note 4, at 234.
40. Id.
41. President's Message on Undocumented Aliens, supra note 38, at 125. Those
eligible for temporary resident alien status would be granted the status only after registering with the INS. Id. They would be ineligible for social services such as Medicaid,
food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and supplemental security income. Id.
42. S. 2252, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 35,792-94 (1977); H.R. 9531,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 33,493 (1977). The two bills, introduced by
Sen. James Eastland and Rep. Peter Rodino, were identical. Bevilacqua, Legal Critique of President Carter's Proposalson Undocumented Aliens, 23 CATH. LAW. 286,
286 (1978).
43. Hearings on S. 2252: Alien Adjustment and Employment Act of 1978, Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1978) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2252] (statement of Sen.
James A. McClure).
44. Id. at 368 (statement of the Mexican-American Political Association); Leaf,
supra note 27, at 82; see Bevilacqua, supra note 42, at 287 (arguing that the cutoff
date should be advanced to a date close to the effective date of the bill).
45. Piore, The "Illegal Aliens" Debate Misses the Boat, reprinted in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 12, at 39. According to Piore, the President's proposals did not
give the problem the priority that was due:
In the current debate, illegal immigration is frequently seen as an oversight; if
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The proposal for temporary resident status, as expected, generated
the most debate. This proposal would allow aliens to remain in the
United States for five years and to travel and work.4 The plan, however, barred aliens from receiving aid through federal assistance programs.47 More importantly, because the plan was silent about what
would happen at the conclusion of the five-year period, aliens would
have been reluctant to take advantage of the amnesty.4 In the end, this
uncertainty contributed to the defeat of the Carter proposals in
Congress.49
The second major development during the Carter years was the establishment of another committee to study the problem of illegal immigration. In 1979, President Carter created the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP).50 Composed of members of
Congress, the executive branch, and the public, SCIRP reflected the
level of national concern that illegal immigration had generated. 1
the laws were better enforced, Americans could calmly provide for limited legal
immigration and protect themselves from an uncontrollable influx of foreign
workers. That is a bit like thinking that illegal liquor during Prohibition was an
oversight. If people want something that is prohibited by law badly enough, a
black market will develop.
Id.
46. President's Message on Undocumented Aliens, supra note 38, at 126; see
Fragomen, President Carter'sAmnesty and Sanctions Proposal,I1 INT'L MIGRATION
REV. 524, 527-28 (1977) (outlining the controversial nature of the proposal's temporary resident status provision). Fragomen argues that the provision would place persons
in a legal limbo, prolonging separation from family members with no certainty as to
their eventual status. Id. A large subculture of people would continue to exist, defeating a main purpose of the amnesty: family reunification. Id.
47. President's Message on Undocumented Aliens, supra note 38, at 126; Leaf,
supra note 27, at 82.
48. Leaf, supra note 27, at 83; Midgley, supra note 33, at 53; see Fragomen, supra
note 46, at 528 (arguing that an undocumented alien would have too much at stake to
voluntarily surrender himself or herself to the INS with no guarantee of eventual immunity from deportation).
49. Midgley, supra note 33, at 53. The Carter proposals died amid widespread citicism in Congress. Leaf, supra note 27, at 84. As Rep. Morris Udall put it, "[a]bout the
only thing we could get agreement on was that the President's proposal was not the
answer." Hearingson S. 2252, supra note 43, at 86. But see Bevilacqua, supra note 42,
at 286-87 (recognizing that although the author preferred a "broader" amnesty, President Carter's initiative was a courageous and humane attempt to deal with the problem
of illegal immigration).
50. See Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907-09 (1978) (establishing the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP)). SCIRP was charged with
studying the immigration laws, policies, and procedures and making administrative and
legislative recommendations to the President and Congress. Id. § 4(c), 92 Stat. 908; D.
NoRTH, supra note 11, at C-3; see Fuchs, supra note 4, at 436-46 (outlining the mandate of SCIRP).
51. See Midgley, supra note 33, at 54 (stating that the chief purpose of creating
SCIRP was to develop measures for controlling illegal immigration). SCIRP originally
consisted of four senators, Alan Simpson, Charles Mathias, Edward Kennedy, and
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The findings of the SCIRP, issued in early 1981, contained an amnesty proposal similar to the Carter plan. 52 The SCIRP recommended
a single legalization program for aliens present in the country prior to
January 1, 1980.13 SCIRP premised commencement of the amnesty on
the implementation of "appropriate enforcement measures. '' 4 The
term "appropriate enforcement measures," because it was vague, eventually became a focal point of contention in the ensuing debates over
amnesty under IRCA 55
The amnesty program outlined in the SCIRP report contained three
major components: a continuous residency requirement, a January 1,
1980 cutoff date, and exclusion based on appropriate grounds.", In
choosing 1980 as the cutoff date, the SCIRP sought to avoid rewarding
aliens who had recently entered the United States relying on the enactment of an amnesty. The 1980 cutoff date also balanced the desire to
provide amnesty to large numbers of aliens with the need to limit that
amnesty to those aliens who held some equity in the United States. 8
The SCIRP proposals, however, were vague about the amount of time
that should elapse before the government could grant permanent residence to amnestied aliens.59 According to Lawrence H. Fuchs, Staff
Director of the SCIRP, the "rule of law" guided the SCIRP in considering the amnesty. 60 It was this rule of law, along with the weight of
Dennis DeConcini; four House members, Peter Rodino, Elizabeth Holtzman, Robert
McClory, and Hamilton Fish; four members of the executive branch, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, Secretary of Labor Ray
Marshall, and Secretary of Health and Human Services Patricia Harris; and four public members, Joaquin F. Otero, Vice President of the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, Judge Cruz Reynoso of the California Court of Appeals, Rose M. Ochi,
Executive Assistant to the Mayor of Los Angeles, and the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh,
former Chair of the Civil Rights Commission and President of Notre Dame University.
Id. at 55; SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at vii. Other cabinet members later replaced
three of the original executive branch members. Id.
52. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at C-3.
53. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 76; Keely, supra note 13, at 341-42; Leaf,
supra note 27, at 85-86.
54. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 82; Midgley, supra note 33, at 59.
55. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (explaining the debates over the
"triggered amnesty" proposal of IRCA which would delay the amnesty until the government implemented enforcement mechanisms).
56. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 72-85; see Leaf, supra note 27, at 84-86
(discussing the three-part proposed amnesty program).
57. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 77.
58. Id. at 77-78.
59. See id. at 148-51 (establishing no definite period of time for legalized aliens to
be granted permanent residence, but implying that it would be soon after legalization).
60. Fuchs, supra note 4, at 438. Fuchs actually mentions three "guiding principles"
for SCIRP: international cooperation, the open society, and the rule of law. Id. According to Fuchs, the rule of law emerged as the most powerful principle:
Although several commissioners had expressed concerns early in their delibera-
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the recommendations, that formed the basis for the eventual approval
of the amnesty provision in IRCA.8 ' SCIRP presented its report to
President Reagan and Congress on March 1, 1981.62
c. The Reagan Years
The Reagan administration considered the SCIRP recommendations
and incorporated them into its July 1981 immigration reform proposals.63 The proposals of the administration, however, were quite different
from those of the SCIRP. The administration proposed to permit individuals who entered the country before January 1, 1980 to apply for a
three-year renewable temporary resident status.' Under the administration proposal, eligible aliens could apply for permanent resident status only after ten years of continuous residency."" During this time,
aliens would be unable to bring relatives to the United States or to
tions that a legalization program would be interpreted as a reward for illegality,
after consideration of the importance of legalization as a part of the entire effort
to restore the rule of law to immigration policy, all commissioners recognized:
that qualified aliens would be able to contribute much more to United States
society once they came into the open; that they would no longer be exploitable at
the work place or continue to contribute to the depression of United States labor
standards or wages; that legalization would aid in the enforcement of United
States immigration laws by enabling the INS to focus its enforcement resources
on new flows of illegal aliens; and that for the first time the United States would
have reliable information about the sources of illegal migration, its characteristics and its impacts.
Id. at 440. But see, Whelan, supra note 17, at 454 (suggesting that an increase in the
INS budget could greatly reduce illegal immigration and that it would be an alternative more in line with the rule of law basis).
61. See McLean, InternationalInstitutionalMechanismsfor Refugees, in US. IraMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 13, at 183 (stating that SCIRP became
the focal point for discussions of issues relating to United States immigration policies).
62. Abrams, American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?, in U.S. lr01iGRATION POLICY, supra note 1, at 125; Midgley, supra note 33, at 58.
63. Midgley, supra note 33, at 64; Giuliani, The Immigration Programof the Reagan Administration, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 807, 813 (1982); Martin & Houstoun,
supra note 1, at 50; see also Hiller, Immigration Policies of the Reagan Administration, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 495, 500-04 (1983) (outlining the Reagan administration
proposals for immigration reform); cf. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109
(1981) (announcing several measures to interdict the illegal entry of aliens by sea).
64. S. 1765, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 101(b)(2), 127 CONG. REC. 25,126-56 (1981);
Palmieri, Foreword to U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PoucY, supra note 13, at xv;
see Smith, Introduction to U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that
while both SCIRP and the Reagan administration proposed an amnesty for undocumented aliens in the United States, the proposals differed in their mechanics); see also
H.R. 4832, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 24,981 (1981) (containing the administration bill as introduced in the House of Representatives).
65. S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a)(1), 127 CONG. REc. 25,126-56 (1981);
Smith, supra note 64, at 7.
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receive federal benefits, despite their obligation to pay taxes."

In response, critics accused the administration of being unfair by denying federal benefits to tax-paying aliens.6 7 Additionally, undocumented aliens would not have been able to apply for permanent residence until ten years had elapsed. 8 Others argued that the Reagan
proposals would prove useless or counterproductive because the strin-

gent conditions would dissuade aliens from applying for the amnesty. 9
One observer argued that in attempting to look generous and tough at
the same time, the administration would deny with one hand what it
offered with the other.7
On the legislative side, the 1980 congressional elections changed the
leadership of the Senate and House subcommittees on immigration.
Senator Alan Simpson, a former member of SCIRP, and Representative Romano Mazzoli brought a strong interest in immigration reform
directly to the subcommittees. 1 Over the next few years, both Houses
of Congress debated the proposed Simpson-Mazzoli bills.72 These bills
66. Palmieri, supra note 64, at xv.
67. Mendez, The Rights of Aliens in the 1980's, 2 ANTIoCH L. J. 39, 41 (1982).
Mendez argues that the Reagan administration proposals would create a class of workers that contributes to the wealth of the country but is entitled to few of its benefits.
Id.; see also Leaf, supra note 27, at 77 (discussing the inconsistency regarding undocumented alien access to federal benefits and taxes).
68. Mendez, supra note 67, at 41. One of the benefits of the permanent resident
status is that the person can apply for citizenship in five years. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
69. Palmieri, supra note 64, at xv. Palmieri argues:
The administration's version of amnesty makes sense only if it is intended to
minimize participation; otherwise it would seem to be an exercise in futility. It is
difficult to appreciate the purpose of legalization when its effect is to create a
class of residents who for a long period pay taxes but are ineligible for services,
unable to reunify their families, and unable to participate in the political process.
Since it seems unlikely that many undocumented people would come forward to
claim these highly indistinct benefits, the plan will fail to achieve the basic purpose of an amnesty-that is, reducing significantly the number of people residing
here illegally.
Id. Palmieri points out that undocumented aliens are often wary of trusting a government that previously pursued and deported them. Id.; see Immigration Control and
Legalization Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 3080 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 93-94 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Legalization Hearings] (statement of Dale S. De Haan, Director of the Church of World Service of the National
Council of Churches) (discussing the undocumented aliens' acceptance of the legalization program).
70. Palmieri, supra note 64, at xvi.
71. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 1-2; D. NORTH, supra note il, at C-4; see D.
REIMERS, supra note 4, at 152 (stating that in 1981 Senator Simpson assumed leadership in the Senate in formulating immigration proposals).
72. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 4,422-26 (1982); H.R. 4327,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 18,584 (1981); S. 529, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
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generally contained a two-tiered amnesty similar to those previously
proposed, 73 but with a shorter time period than that proposed by the
Reagan administration before the legalized aliens could apply for permanent residence.74 Although the Senate passed versions of the bill in
1982 and 1983, the House failed to act on the legislation until 1984.
The 1984 bill, however, died in the last days of the Ninety-eighth Congress when a House-Senate conference failed to reach agreement on an
amnesty proposal.7 5 Although unsuccessful, the various Simpson-Mazzoli bills focused debate and clarified issues, setting the stage for the
approval of IRCA in 1986.
The 1986 debates over IRCA focused on three main issues. As already discussed, the first issue was whether to provide government benefits or services to aliens that receive amnesty.76 The final version of
IRCA excludes aliens from receiving benefits for five years except for a
few selected programs. 7
The second issue in the debates concerned whether to enact an immediate amnesty or a "triggered" amnesty.78 A triggered amnesty
would delay the legalization of aliens until a presidential commission
129

CONG.

REC. 51,308 (1984); H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC.

4,578 (1984); see supra, note I (discussing a brief history of the Simpson-Mazzoli
bills).

73. See supra notes 40-41
amnesty).
74. See S. 2222, 97th Cong.,
permanent resident alien status
January 1, 1977, and temporary

and accompanying text (discussing the two-tiered
2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 4,422-26 (1982) (providing
for persons who arrived in the United States before
resident alien status for those who arrived after that

date, but before January 1, 1980).
75. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 2.

76. See supra notes 157-63 (discussing the debate over the denial of benefits under
the amnesty proposals). The exclusion of benefits is usually justified as a cost-saving

measure. See 1985 House Legalization Hearings,supra note 69, at 258-61 (statement
of Janice Peskin of the Congressional Budget Office) (expressing concern over the costs
of amnesty with regard to government programs). But cf. Leaf, supra note 27, at 77
(arguing that because undocumented aliens are situated similarly to other taxpayers,
their exclusion from federal programs may violate the equal protection clause of the

United States Constitution). A 1975 Labor Department study estimated that 73% of
all undocumented aliens had federal income taxes deducted from their paychecks,

while 77% had social security taxes withheld. Id.
77. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h) (Supp. IV
1986); Pear, supra note 1, at Al, col. 6.
78. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985, S. 1200 Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigrationand Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

99th Cong., 1st Sess. 444-46 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearings] (statement of
Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner of the INS); see Leibowitz, Comparative Analysis of
Immigration in Key Developed Countries in Relation to Immigration Reform and
Control Legislation in the United States, 7 Huht. RTs. L.J. 1, 68 (1986) (stating that
in 1985 the Senate made a radical change in the amnesty provision of S. 1200 by

making it contingent on the effective enforcement of employer sanctions).
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determines that adequate enforcement mechanisms are in place and the
entry of undocumented aliens is under control.7 9 The rationale is that
without adequate enforcement, an amnesty would offer an invitation to
thousands of aliens to cross the borders of the United States seeking
legal status.80 Although some groups expressed support for a triggered
amnesty, 81 widespread criticism quickly surfaced. Many argued that
the complexity of the provision would preclude its enactment and instead advocated a simplified administrative program. 82 In the final version of the bill, Congress rejected a triggered amnesty in favor of a
program beginning almost immediately.83
The cutoff date was a third major issue in the amnesty debate.84
Supporters of a liberal amnesty argued for a date relatively close to the
date of enactment, whereas supporters of a restrictive amnesty wanted
a date further in the past.85 In the end, IRCA established a date of
79. S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201-02 131 CONG. REC. S7040-54 (daily ed.
May 23, 1985). The bill provided that the amnesty take effect only when a presidential
commission determined that adequate border enforcement and employer sanctions were
functioning effectively. Id. In particular, the commission would have to establish that
the following conditions were satisfied: (1) illegal entry into the United States has been
controlled, (2) violations of terms of entry have been reduced, and (3) the employment
of undocumented aliens has been eliminated. 1985 Senate Hearings,supra note 78, at
93.

80. 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 78, at 255 (statement of Rep. James H.
Scheuer).
81. Id. at 264 (statement of Roger Conner of the Federation for American Immigration Reform); id. at 298 (statement of Dr. M. Rupert Cutler of the Environmental
Fund); see also Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 68-69 (suggesting that the Reagan administration's concerns about the cost of the amnesty bolstered the idea of a delayed amfiesty because a presidential commission would almost assure that no money would be
spent for several years).
82. 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 78, at 362-63 (statement of Dale S. De
Haan of the National Council of Churches). Some argued that because the conditions
for amnesty depend on uncertain factors, such as adequate border enforcement and an
end to undocumented alien employment, making amnesty contingent on those factors
may mean that it is never enacted. See id. at 459-69 (statement of Richard H. Keatinge of the American Bar Association) (arguing that the provisions of S. 1200 do not
guarantee that there will ever be a legalization program or, if one is established, that
its results will be definite); see also Abrams, supra note 61, at 127 (pointing out that if
an alien has a sufficient stake in the United States, the amnesty should be full, not
partial).
83. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV
1986) (providing for an amnesty that is not contingent on anything to "trigger" it); see
also infra notes 129-72 and accompanying text (outlining the specifics of amnesty
under IRCA).
84. See D.

NORTH, CIS PAPER, IMMIGRATION REFORM IN ITS FIRST YEAR

19-20

(1987) [hereinafter CIS PAPER] (stating that there was spirited debate in Congress
over the cutoff date of the amnesty).
85. See 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 78, at 151-52 (statement of Richard
Fajardo of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund) (arguing for
a relatively late cutoff date). Advocates of a late cutoff date were concerned that many
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January 1, 1982, reflecting a compromise between these two positions. 81
B.

CURRENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM

Illegal immigration is undoubtedly a major problem in the United

States.81 The number of INS apprehensions of undocumented aliens
illustrates the magnitude of the problem.8 8 In the middle of fiscal year
1986, the INS produced an all-time apprehension record of over 1.2
million aliens, a 10.9 % increase over those apprehended during the entire year of 1984.89 Because these figures represent only aliens the INS
has apprehended, the total number of undocumented aliens in the

United States is much higher. Although the precise number is not
known, in early 1987 INS officials estimated that 6.5 to 7 million undocumented aliens were living in the United States."'
aliens would not be brought into legal status if the date was set far before the passage
of the law. Id. at 152. But see 1985 House Legalization Hearings,supra note 69, at
189 (statement of Dr. M. Rupert Cutler of the Environmental Fund) (arguing for the
cutoff date to be rolled back to an earlier date).
86. CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 20. The cost of implementation was another issue
in the debates over amnesty. See 1985 House Legalization Hearings,supra note 69, at
265 (statement of James Muller of the Urban Institute) (citing Congressional Budget
Office estimates, finding that excluding 1.4 million legalized persons from federal assistance programs would cost states and localities as much as S730 million a year); see
also id. at 256-61 (statement of Janice Peskin of the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO)) (stating that $600 million may cover the costs of amnesty). The CBO premised this estimate on 60% of undocumented aliens applying for amnesty. Id.
87. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983, Hearings on H.R. 1510 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1247 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Dante Fascell); see 1985 House Legalization Hearings,supra
note 69, at 31 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner of the INS) (stating that
the illegal immigration problem is getting worse).
88. See Leaf, supra note 27, at 67 (stating that INS apprehension figures are the
only hard data available on the trends of illegal immigration).
89. Enforcement: Dealing With Illegal Immigration, INS REP. 4 (Fall/Winter
1985-86). 94% of these apprehensions were made in the southwest border states of
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Id.
90. Arocha, INS Bracesfor Flood of Aliens, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1987, at A8, col.
1. Another way of attempting to determine the number of undocumented aliens is
through the national census. The 1980 census counted 2,057,000 undocumented aliens.
1985 House Legalization Hearings,supra note 69, at 228 (statement of Jeffrey Passel,
Chief, Population and Analysis Staff, Bureau of the Census). The Bureau of the Census derived its 1980 numbers from a comparison of two different sets of estimates: (1)
estimates of the total number of aliens included in the census, and (2) estimates of the
number of aliens residing legally in the country at the census date. Id. The difference
represents the number of undocumented aliens. Id. Because the census figures arc
lower than other estimates, their validity is questionable. In general, arriving at accurate numbers when based on a census is problematic. See M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at
51 (pointing out that census-based estimates are only marginally useful because undocumented aliens are unlikely to report their status, and the Census Bureau has no
way of accurately enumerating undocumented aliens).
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The ethnic composition of the majority of aliens entering the country
since the 1970s is quite different from that of those aliens who entered
in previous time periods. From 1971 to 1976, forty-one percent of the
aliens admitted to the United States came from Latin America while
thirty-two percent came from Asia.9 From 1977 to 1979, the numbers
were forty-two percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively.9 2 The majority of the undocumented aliens in the United States, about fifty-five
to sixty percent are Mexican. 3 Available evidence indicates that the
typical undocumented alien is a young Hispanic male between the ages
of fifteen and twenty-nine who is relatively unskilled and poorly
educated.94

This consistent pattern of illegal immigration has resulted in an
enormous underground population living outside the law and avoiding
both its sanctions and protections.95 It has created an image of lawless91. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 51; T. KESSNER & B. CAROLI, supra note 29, at
17 (discussing that of the 21 countries responsible for the bulk of immigration to the
United States since 1965, only two, Greece and Italy, are "traditional" sources of
immigration).
92. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 58. Morris draws a useful comparison with immigration patterns from earlier time periods. For example, the current numbers can be
compared to the years 1901 to 1930, when 81% of immigrants came from Europe, as
opposed to the 5% from Latin America and 3% from Asia. Id.; see also U.S. NEws
AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 24, 1986, at 32 (suggesting that if trends continue, by the
year 2080 more than half of all United States citizens will be Hispanic, Asian, or
Black, and 40% of workers will be immigrants or descendants of immigrants who arrived after 1980). See generally D. REIMERS, supra note 4, at 122-54 (describing how,
since the legislative changes of 1965, more persons from the Western Hemisphere have
been immigrating into the United States).
93. 1985 House Legalization Hearings, supra note 69, at 224 (statement of Jeffrey
Passel, Chief, Population and Analysis Staff, Bureau of the Census); Developments in
the Law, Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 1286, 1436
(1983); Corwin, supra note 6, at 223. Corwin's study revealed a low number of 5.4
million and a high number of 6.79 million Mexicans residing illegally in the United
States. Id. at 248. Other regions were represented as follows: 400,000 to 530,000 people from the Caribbean; 390,000 to 500,000 Central Americans; 270,000 to 380,000
South Americans; 440,000 to 540,000 Asians; 320,000 to 350,000 Middle Easterners
and East Indians; 500,000 to 600,000 others, including Canadians, Europeans, and
Africans. Id. at 248-49.
94. See 1985 House Legalization Hearings, supra note 69, at 224 (statement of
Jeffrey Passel, Chief, Population and Analysis Staff, Bureau of the Census) (citing
figures showing that 49% of undocumented aliens are between 15 and 29 years old,
22% are in their thirties, 18% are under 15, and 11% are over 40); M. MORRIS, supra
note 1, at 62 (stating that undocumented aliens are not as well educated as the legal
immigrant population and more likely to be of labor age); Waldinger, The Occupational and Economic Integration of the New Immigrants, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 1, at 197 (stating that most undocumented aliens are poorly educated
and worked in agricultural and blue collar jobs in their native countries).
95. See Employer Sanctions, supra note 2, at 991 (acknowledging the problems
resulting from communities of undocumented aliens living outside the law). Senator
Simpson stated that one of the purposes of the Simpson-Mazzoli bills was to "bring an
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ness and disrespect for law and has generated an entire range of illegal
activities peripheral to the undocumented population. 0 The sheer numbers of newly arrived persons also affects socioeconomic conditions in
the United States. 97 While some effect is certain, the benefit or detriment of this phenomenon is debatable.98 Part II of this Comment disillegal subsociety" out into the open. 129 CONG. REC. S6906 (daily ed. May 18,
1983)(Statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson).
There is widespread confusion as to what the legal rights of undocumented aliens
are. See The Legal Status, supra note 31, at 668-69 (explaining that while some courts
have treated undocumented aliens as outlaws who forfeit their legal rights upon violations of immigration laws, other courts maintain that undocumented aliens are legal
persons entitled to basic rights).
96. See United States Department of Justice, The Criminal Use of False Identification, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 12, at 145 [hereinafter Criminal Use] (outlining several kinds of illegal activities associated with illegal immigration). One such
activity involves the duplication and forgery of documents, such as "green cards," that
help undocumented aliens avoid capture and deportation. Id. The "green card" (INS
Form 1-551) is the basic proof of status as a lawful permanent resident of the United
States. R. MADISON, THE GREENCARD BOOK 1 (1981). There is widespread fraud involving the duplication and forgery of social security cards which, like green cards,
undocumented aliens use for identification purposes. D. REIMERS, supra note 4, at 21112.
Another effect of illegal immigration is an increase in the number of professional
smugglers, commonly called "coyotes," who help dozens of aliens cross the border
every day. Criminal Use, supra at 145; see also R. GOLEN & M. MCCONNELL,
SANCTUARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 37-40 (1986) (describing one particular "coyote" responsible for bringing approximately 700 Central Americans across
the border).
97. See Waldinger, supra note 94, at 197 (noting that, as an aspect of economic
impact, the key question in the immigration debate is the impact of immigrants on the
labor market); 1983 House Hearings,supra note 87, at 431 (statement of Rep. Charles
Wilson) (expressing concern over the negative impact of illegal immigration on the
unemployment situation); see also Economic and DemographicConsequencesof Immigration: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and
Security Economics of the Joint Economic Comm. of the Congress of the United
States, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on Economic Consequences] (statement of Beryl W. Sprinkel, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers) (noting that although immigrants work, save, pay taxes, and consume public
services, there is concern about their effect on the job opportunities and wages of native-born persons). But see P. HILL, THE

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION INTO

27 (1975) (arguing that immigration has negligible effccts on the
per capita income of the population).
98. See Waldinger, supra note 94, at 197 (discussing the debate over the socioeconomic effects of immigration). Waldinger offers two opposing arguments regarding the
impact of aliens on the labor market: one side argues that the presence of new immigrants increases the labor supply leading to lower wages, increased unemployment, and
a disruption of normal labor patterns; the other side argues that immigrants fill the
lower level "noncompeting" jobs that complement the higher level jobs filled by natives.
Id.; see also T. KESSNER & B. CAROLI, supra note 29, at 74 (noting that many industries, especially the agricultural and clothing industries, depend on undocumented
Mexican workers); D. REIMERS, supra note 4, at 227 (stating that the issue of the
effect of undocumented aliens on the labor market is highly controversial).
Illegal immigration also has created adverse political effects for United States forTHE UNITED STATES
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cusses this economic debate.
Finally, the volume of illegal imigration has strained the administrative offices of the federal government.99 In particular, the great number
of cases that the INS handles has overburdened that agency and resulted in low morale and widespread criticism.10 0 One response, increasing both the INS budget and the ranks of the agency, is not
enough."0 '
As a consequence of these problems, Congress enacted an immigraeign policy. See TIME, July 9, 1984, at 58 (describing the resentment felt in Mexico
over Senate passage of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill in 1984). Many Mexicans were angry
about the employer sanctions provisions. Id. Some viewed the bill not as immigration
reform, but as an act of aggression because it threatened Mexico's "safety valve" of an
open border with the United States. Id.
99. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 88-89. Six federal agencies share the administration of immigration policies. Id. at 87. Two of these agencies have the primary responsibility for enforcement: the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the country, and the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs outside the country. Id.
The other agencies include the Office of Labor Certification in the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Public Health and the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs in the Executive Office of the President. Id.
100. Id. Morris instructively labels the problem "the beleaguered bureaucracy." Id.
Many today still share Rep. Joshua Eilberg's 1977 view that the INS is incapable of
administering and enforcing the INA. Id. The following statement is instructive:
The Service is at this point a disgrace. Each year we institute some new "initiative" in the name of efficiency and come one additional step closer to simply
giving up the store. It is high time someone took a long hard look, not only at the
effects of illegal immigration on this society, but at the state of affairs that benign neglect has created in this agency. The picture is not a pretty one. The INS
is a management disaster, it is undermanned, it has been underfunded for more
years than I have been in its employ. It begs for philosophical leadership and a
clear law enforcement mandate.
Immigration and Naturalization Service Budget Authorization, Fiscal Year 1986,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1985) [hereinafter INS
Budget Hearings] (statement of Charles J. Murphy, President, National Immigration
and Naturalization Service Council, American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO); see PanelDiscussion, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939, 953 (1982) (statement of
Rudolph W. Giuliani) (stating that the severe management and budget problems are
the product of years of treating immigration as a secondary problem); 1983 House
Hearings,supra note 87, at 1305 (statement of the Federation for American Immigration Reform) (citing an estimate that the Border Patrol is operating at an effectiveness
level between 33% and 50%, allowing one to two persons to enter the country for
every one apprehended).
101. See M. MORRIs, supra note 1, at 132 (showing that INS budget requests and
congressional appropriations increased every year between 1969 and 1984). Illustrative
of Congress's perception of the immigration problem is the percentage increase in appropriations from 1981 to 1982, a 21.1% increase. Id.; see also, INS REP., supra note
89, at 4 (pointing out that the INS added 768 new Border Patrol agents in 1985). But
see Abrams, supra note 62, at 124 (stating that since the 1970s, the INS budget has
not kept up with the number of aliens that it has to process). As Abrams explains,
"there are too few people attempting to accomplish far too much work." Id.
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tion reform law containing a broad amnesty. IRCA is a response from
a Congress that was long inactive in the face of a growing national
problem. As in Canada, the United States Congress is hoping that the
amnesty will bring within the law millions of undocumented aliens currently living outside of it.
C. THE CANADIAN AMNESTY EXPERIENCE
1. Background
Canada, like the United States, has welcomed immigrants throughout much of its history.1 ' 2 In 1973, Canada continued this "open arms"
policy with legislation granting a generous amnesty to undocumented
aliens. To understand why the Canadian government decided to enact
an amnesty, however, one must examine Canadian immigration policies
and their effects in the 1960s.
Although Canadians expected their Conservative Party government
to provide some legislative action on immigration matters in the early
1960s, by the time the Liberal Party under Lester Pearson regained
power in 1963, there had been little action by the government or Parliament.1 0 3 The Liberals, especially Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Rene Tremblay, were therefore determined to change the way
Canada formulated its immigration policies. 1°4 Accordingly, beginning
in 1966, they took a series of steps that would have long-term effects.
First, the government enacted the Government Organization Act of
1966 (Act).1 5 The Act eliminated the Department of Citizenship and
102. See G. DIRKS, CANADA'S REFUGEE POLICY: INDIFFERENCE OR OPPORTUNISM
preface (1977) (stating that Canada traditionally has welcomed and encouraged immigration). But see F. HAWKINS, CANADA AND IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC CONCERN 33 (1972) (stating that unlike the United States, Canadians have no

settled view or common convictions about immigration). Hawkins disputes the reference to Canada as a "nation of immigrants" by pointing out that there are essentially
two founding groups in Canada: the British and the French. Id. at 34; see Harakas,
CanadianImmigration Law and the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, 1985
DET. C.L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1985) (stating that immigration to Canada has been a
privilege and not a right); cf. THE IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE CANADIAN
IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION STUDY 37-38 (1974) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION PROGRAM] (stating that historically immigration priorities have shifted according to national requirements in the development of Canadian society and its economy).
103. C. WYDRZYNSKI, CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 58 (1983).
104. F. HAWKINS, supra note 102, at 141. Hawkins writes that Tremblay initiated
a badly needed "new deal" in immigration which focused on administrative improvements. Id.; see also Marr, Canadian Immigration Policies Since 1962, 1 CANADIAN
PUB. POL'Y 196 (Spring 1975) (stating that attempts to enhance the efficiency of Canadian immigration offices began with Tremblay in 1964).
105. Government Organization Act of 1966, ch. 25, Can. Stat. 161 §§ 11-14
(1966).
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Immigration in favor of a new Department of Manpower and Immigration. 106 This change reflected the prevailing view that immigration was
a function of domestic labor and economic policy and, thus, a single
107
administrative structure should regulate it.
Second, the newly formed Department of Manpower and Immigration published the White Paper on immigration in late 1966.108 The
White Paper emphasized the need in Canada for immigrants and,

therefore, recommended that immigration be actively encouraged. 0 '
The report, produced during a period of relative economic prosperity,
presented a very positive statement on immigration.

10

Two decisions made in 1967 had a significant impact on the immigration policies of Canada. First, the government permitted short-term
visitors, such as students and tourists, to apply for readjustment of status from nonimmigrant to immigrant while in Canada.' Second, Parliament made the Immigration Appeal Board (IAB) of the Department
of Manpower and Immigration independent and reorganized it to allow
all aliens facing deportation to appeal their cases."'
106.

Id.; C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra note 103, at 58.
C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra note 103, at 58; F. HAWKINS, supra note 102, at 33839. Hawkins explains that this is a highly logical arrangement for Canada because
"[e]ven if immigration could manage without manpower, it would be difficult for manpower to manage without immigration." Id. at 339; see IMMIGRATION POLICY PERSPECTIVES: REPORT OF THE CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION STUDY 60 (1974)
(stating that as Canada's industrial growth produced new labor priorities, its immigration policies changed); Marr, supra note 104, at 198 (maintaining that the "wedding"
of immigration with manpower is logical and advantageous for Canada; see also id. at
197 (explaining that since 1962 the Canadian government has stressed economic factors, such as education, training, and job opportunities in the immigration selection
system).
108. DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION, WHITE PAPER ON IMMIGRATION (1966) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; see F. HAWKINS, supra note 102, at 159-61
(describing the White Paper and its objectives).
109. WHITE PAPER, supra note 108, at 41. The White Paperspecifically states that
"[i]mmigration has made a major contribution to the national objectives of maintaining a high rate of population and economic growth." Id. at 5. Immigration programs
meant "[a] steady policy of recruitment based on long term considerations of economic
growth." Id. at 12; see also C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra note 103, at 59-60 (outlining the
White Paper's recommendations).
110. C. WYDRZYNSKI, supra note 103, at 59.
111. Immigration Regulations, Pt. I, 101 Can. Gaz. 11 1350 (Sept. 13, 1967). Previously, persons could apply for immigrant status only from outside Canada. D. North,
supra note 11, at A-13; see also LAW UNION OF ONTARIO, THE IMMIGRANT'S HANDBOOK 41 (1981) (stating that in the late 1960s and early 1970s it was relatively easy to
obtain landed immigrant status in Canada).
In Canada, "landed immigrant" status is analogous to permanent resident status in
the United States. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-13.
112. Immigration Appeal Board Act of 1967, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. 1-3 (1970). The
Immigration Appeal Board (IAB) of 1967 replaced the one created in 1956, which had
no authority to consider appeals. Id.; cf G. DIRKS, supra note 102, at 230 (explaining

107.
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Immigration to Canada greatly increased as a result of large numbers of people entering the country to seek landed immigrant status.

The monthly total of persons arriving in Canada almost doubled from
early 1972 to September of that year, and more than doubled again by
the middle of 1973.13 As a result, appeals from aliens facing deporta-

tion flooded the IAB. The IAB, designed to handle 100 cases a month,
began receiving new cases at the rate of 1000 a month.11 4 The result
was an immigration system out of control.
2.

Canadian Amnesty

The amnesty program in Canada consisted of two tiers: Project 80,
adopted in June 1972, and Project 97 enacted in 1973. Project 80 was
aimed at alleviating the backlog of IAB cases.11 This measure consisted of a relatively simple administrative program that involved a
screening of the backlog of cases before the IAB and the subsequent
weeding out of relatively easy cases."' Canada liberalized the criteria
for granting landed immigrant status and, except in extreme criminal
17
cases, granted most aliens that status.'
In November 1972, the Canadian government revoked its 1967 decision to allow nonimmigrants to apply for readjustment of status.118 This
that the lAB has had a great impact on Canadian refugee policy since 1967).
113. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-13-A-14; see IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, stipra
note 102, at 36 (discussing the dramatic rise in immigration).

114. See

DEBATES OF THE SENATE

(Canada), Sess. 1973-1974, 891 [hereinafter

(statement of Sen. Paul Yusyk). (citing figures showing the following increase in the lAB's caseload since 1969: Jan. 1, 1969, 200 cases; Jan. 1, 1970,
1750 cases; Jan. 1, 1971, 4750 cases; Jan. 1, 1972, 8081 cases; Jan. 1, 1973, 11,875
cases; June 1, 1973, 17,472 cases); see also Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 31 (indicating
that the number of applications for adjustment of status before the lAB rose from a
monthly total of 3,750 in 1970 to 8,700 in late 1972).
115. Liebowitz, supra note 78, at 30-31; see IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note
102, at 36-37 (describing Project 80 as an administrative program to clear the lAB
backlog through a partial amnesty).
116. D. NORTH, supra note 1I, at A-19; see Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 31 (outlining the procedure under Project 80). The alien did not need to apply or decide
whether to participate. Id.
117. Liebowitz, supra note 78, at 31. The following cases are illustrative of the
types of criminal cases where the lAB has deported aliens in the past. See Claud Albert Akkaoui, 7 I.A.C. 177 (1973) (deporting an alien for a conviction in the United
States for interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle); Roosevelt Bernard Douglas, 10
I.A.C. 428 (1975) (deporting an alien convicted of mischief under the Criminal Code
of Canada); Lorraine Carol Burton, 9 I.A.C. 277 (1974) (deporting an alien for possession of marijuana).
118. Amendment of Immigration Regulations, Pt. I, 106 Can. Gaz. 11 1991 (Nov.
6, 1972); D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-16. North described the revocation of the
decision allowing nonimmigrants to adjust their status as "changing the rules in the
middle of the game." Id. This decision left a large number of aliens who had arrived in
SENATE DEBATES]
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decision had the effect of placing in a legal limbo those aliens who had
arrived in Canada seeking landed immigrant status. As a result, the
government proposed a generous amnesty to Parliament in the form of
an amendment to the Immigration Appeal Board Act of 1967.111 Legislators introduced the bill, called Project 97, in June and it took effect
less than two months later.12 0 Project 97 was a legislative response to
the illegal immigration problem, whereas Project 80 was an administrative measure. The legislation provided a sixty-day period during which
all undocumented aliens residing in the country since November 30,
1972 could apply for landed immigrant status. 2 1
Under Project 97, individual immigration officers who interviewed
the aliens retained discretion to grant landed immigrant status. As was
done under Project 80, they denied only the hard criminal cases. 2 ' The
Ministry of Manpower and Immigration handled the administration of
the amnesty and was sensitive to the aliens' concerns of government
reprisals. 2 3
One interesting aspect of the amnesty was the relatively short time
frame of the offer. The rationale for this was that the sixty-day period
would focus the attention of the aliens on the amnesty and produce as
many applicants as would a long and relaxed campaign. 2 4 In addition,
Canada with the intention of seeking adjustment of status without any legal recourse.

Id.; see IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note 102, at 37 (stating that the Parliament
intended that the legislation be a holding measure until new legislation could be
prepared).
119. Act of July 27, 1973 to Amend the Immigration Appeal Board Act, ch. 27,
1973-1974 Can. Stat. 423 (proclaimed in force, Aug. 15, 1973); see SENATE DEBATES,
supra note 114, at 884 (statement of Sen. Jean-Paul Deschatelets) (stating that the bill
was an emergency measure); id. at 891 (statement of Sen. Paul Yuzyk) (stating that
the bill was an emergency response to an intolerable crisis).
120. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-17; see Immigration Adjustment of Status
Regulations, 107 Can. Gaz. II 2069 (Aug. 3, 1973) [hereinafter Adjustment Regulations] (promulgating regulations for the act to take effect on August 15, 1973).
121. Act of July 27, 1973 to Amend the Immigration Appeal Board Act, ch. 27,
1973-1974 Can. Stat. 423, 429 (proclaimed in force, Aug. 15, 1973); Leibowitz, supra
note 78, at 31-32.
122. See supra note 117 (describing the types of criminal cases where the lAB
denied appeal from deportation). The regulations gave broad discretion to the immigration officers. See Adjustment Regulations supra note 120, at 2 (allowing consideration
of the alien's financial situation, employment, education, linguistic abilities, availability
of family, and business in Canada).
123. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-22. An alien who was fearful of coming forward could send a third person to the immigration official with the pertinent information and the alien would then have to come forward only after the Ministry made a
prospective decision on the application. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 33. If the alien
decided not to take advantage of the amnesty, he or she faced deportation without
appeal if discovered. Id.
124. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-23. But see SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at
79 (arguing that the sixty-day time period for the Canadian amnesty was too short).
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Project 97 received wide publicity and faced a minimum amount of
125
opposition from political parties, the public, and the media.

Although the Canadian government initially speculated that as many
as 200,000 persons would take advantage of the amnesty, in the end

only about 52,000 aliens benefited: 13,000 from Project 80 and 39,000
from Project 97.126 It is noteworthy that aliens filed fully ten percent of

the applications for amnesty on the final day of the program.1 27 Although the amnesty did not produce the numbers expected, Canadians
viewed the program as a success. 128 Additionally, the program provides

the United States with useful lessons in the implementation of the
IRCA amnesty.
II.

AMNESTY UNDER IRCA
A. The Law

Title II of IRCA provides an amnesty for undocumented aliens currently residing in the United States and directs the Attorney General to
promulgate implementing regulations.1 29 Although Title II is divided

into four sections,

30

it is the first one, the legalization of status sec-

125. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-24--A-26.
126. Id. at A-20-A-28. About half of those receiving Project 97 amnesty resided
in Ontario and about 20% resided in Quebec. Id. at A-37.
It is significant that about 19,500 of the 39,000 aliens that came forward under
Project 97 were "illegal aliens" in the sense that the phrase is used in the United
States. Id. This group included some of the aliens facing deportation when they became
eligible for Project 80. Id. at A-38. "Non-immigrants," which included large numbers
of foreign students residing in Canada accounted for 20,000 of the aliens participating
in Project 97. Id.
127. CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 22.
128. W. ROBINSON: A REPORT TO THE HONORABLE LLOYD AXwORTHY MINISTER
OF

EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION ON ILLEGAL MIGRANTS IN CANADA

33 (June,

1983) [hereinafter ROBINSON REPORT]; see D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-48; cf.
Leibowitz, supra note 7S, at 21 (stating that Canada is often looked at as the key
analogue to the United States with respect to amnesty).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A, 8 U.S.C. 1255a (Supp. IV 1986).
In IRCA, Congress directed the Attorney General to prescribe regulations after consulting with the Judiciary Committees of the House of Representatives and Senate. Id.
§ 245A(g). IRCA is only enabling legislation. Wilentz, Harvest of Confusion, TIME,
Nov. 3, 1986, at 28. The regulations contain the mechanics of the amnesty program.
See INS Issues Final Regulations to Implement Simpson-Rodino Act, 64 Interpreter
Releases (Fed. Pub.) 517, 517-19 (May 4, 1987) [hereinafter INS FinalRegulations]
(describing the final regulations that the INS issued to implement legalization under
IRCA); see also INS Announces ProposedSimpson-Rodino Act Regulations, 64 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 307, 307-11 (Mar. 19, 1987) [hereinafter INS Proposed
Regulations] (reporting on the regulations that the INS proposed in March 1987).
130. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 201204, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3411 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Section 202 provides for a special adjustment of status for Cubans and Haitians. Id. §
202. Section 203 updates the registry date to January 1, 1972. Id. § 203 (codified at 8
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tion,"31 that is most important for amnesty purposes. Additionally, Title
III provides an amnesty for "Special Agricultural Workers"
(SAWs).12 This Comment focuses solely on the main amnesty pro-

gram under Title II.
IRCA provides that the Attorney General shall adjust the undocumented status of aliens to that of lawfully admitted for temporary residence provided that the aliens meet certain requirements. 13 3 First,
aliens must apply for adjustment of status during the twelve-month period beginning on a date set by the Attorney General.1 3 The implementing regulations designated May 5, 1987 as that date; therefore,
aliens must apply for amnesty by May 4, 1988.15
Second, aliens must establish that they entered the United States
before January 1, 1982 and that they have resided continuously in the
country in an illegal status since that date. 6 Aliens who entered as
U.S.C. § 1259). Section 204 appropriates $1 billion over four years to carry out the
amnesty program. Id. § 204.
131. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV
1986).
132. Id.§§ 210, 216.
133. Id.§ 245A.
134. Id. § 245A(a)(1)(A). The Attorney General, through the INS, commenced
the program on May 5, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 16190, 16209 (1987) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 245a.2(a)); Thornton, INS Begins Amnesty Program, Wash. Post, Nov. 22,
1986, at Al, col. 2. INS officials did not arrest any aliens who reported before that
date, but asked them to return later. Id.
This "timely application" requirement is important because if a person fails to apply
within this period of time, the INS will not grant relief. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(f)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (providing that no
administrative or judicial proceeding may review the legalization denial based on a late
filing of an application); see also Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (denying relief to an alien who failed to file a "timely application" for a change
of status); cf. Hernandez v. Warden, 813 F.2d 633, 633 (3rd Cir. 1987) (stating that
upon enactment IRCA did not change an alien's status automatically; he or she must
apply for a change of status).
An important section of IRCA provides that aliens who the INS apprehends before
or during the application period and who can establish a prima facie case for amnesty,
may not be deported. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(e), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(e) (Supp. IV 1986); see Carrete-Michel v. INS, 811 F.2d 442, 443-44 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that INA section 245A(e) provides an alien relief from deportation);
Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a preliminary
injunction against the deportation of an alien until such time as she could apply for
legalization); see also Holley, Suit Seeks to Bar INS Deporting of Aliens Eligiblefor
Amnesty, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 1986, Part I, at 3, col. 5 (reporting a lawsuit by a
coalition of immigrants' rights organizations seeking to enjoin the INS from deporting
aliens who appear to qualify for amnesty); cf. Lopez-Rayas v. INS, 828 F.2d 1134,
1134 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that temporary residence cards issued under IRCA's
amnesty program protected aliens from deportation).
135. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,209 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
245a.2(a)(l)).
136. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A)
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nonimmigrants1 37 before January 1, 1982 must establish that their periods of authorized stay expired before that date through the passage of
time or that their unlawful status was known to the government as of

that date. 38 The key phrase here is "known to the government" and it
is a source of controversy. 139 Despite considerable public opposition, the
implementing
regulations defined the phrase as meaning "known to the
INS.,,1 40
(Supp. IV 1986). Aliens are deemed to have "resided continuously" ifthey were not
absent from the United States for an aggregate of 180 days between January 1, 1982
and the date they apply for amnesty, with no single absence of more than 45 days. 52
Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,205 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(c)(l)(i)). In
addition, the aliens must have been maintaining a residence in the United States and
their departure must not have been based on a deportation order. Id. at 16,205 (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.I(c)(1)(ii),(iii)). This is a potentially problematic section of
IRCA because aliens must provide tangible documentation that they have resided in
the United States for more than five years. Immigration and Nationality Act, §
245A(g)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190,
16,210 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 (c)). According to the regulations,
this documentation may include such items as: past employment records, including
paycheck stubs and tax forms; utility bills; school records; hospital or medical records;
attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations; or any other supporting documents, including money order receipts, bank books, social security cards, automobile
registrations, deeds or contracts, or insurance policies. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,210-11
(1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 (d)(3)). Many undocumented aliens in the
United States, however, have avoided accumulating such documentation for fear of
being discovered and deported. Wilentz, supra note 129, at 28. Consequently, many
aliens may have difficulty proving that they arrived before 1982. Id. This potential lack
of proof prompted fears that aliens would use fraudulent documentation. Pear, Immigration Bill Approved; Bars HiringIllegal Aliens but Gives Millions Amnesty, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1986, at A8, col. 5 (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm); see May, A.B.A.
Sees Risk of Fraud by People Aiding Illegal Aliens, L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, Part I,
at 6, col. I(reporting American Bar Association fears that aliens will resort to fraud).
137. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)
(Supp. IV 1986) (enumerating the various kinds of nonimmigrant classes, including
diplomats, visitors, temporary workers, and students, among others).
138. Id. § 245A(a)(2)(B).
139. See INS Final Regulations, supra note 129, at 518 (reporting that the INS
received 91 negative comments on its initial proposal on the meaning of "known to the
Government"); see also INS Proposed Regulations, supra note 129, at 309 (labelling

as "unduly restrictive" the definitions given by the INS to, among others, the "known

to the Government" phrase).
140. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,208 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
245a.l(d)) (defining the term "Government" as meaning the INS). The regulations
provide that an alien's unlawful status was known to the government in only four situations: first, if the INS received information on the alien from another federal agency;
second, if the INS made an affirmative determination prior to January 1, 1982 that the
alien was subject to deportation proceedings; third, if the INS responded to an inquiry
by another agency regarding the alien's status; fourth, if the applicant produces documentation from a school stating that he or she had violated his or her nonimmigrant
student status. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,208 (1987), amended by 52 Fed. Reg. 43,845
(1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1 (d)); see INS Final Regulations, supra
note 129, at 518 (predicting that the controversy is likely to result in litigation).
A lawsuit did challenge the position of the INS on the interpretation of the "known
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Third, aliens must prove that they have been continuously present in
the United States since the date of enactment of IRCA. 141 They will
not, however, be deemed to have failed in this by "brief, casual and
innocent" absences. 142 This too has been a source of controversy. After
to the Government" phrase. Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
In Farzad, the court held that the INS definition was inconsistent with IRCA and
outside the scope of authority of the INS. Id. at 694. But see Kalaw v. Ferro, 651 F.
Supp. 1163, 1170 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (endorsing the view of the INS on the "known to
the Government" phrase). The court in Kalaw, however, expressed some concern that
the INS definition may make IRCA legalization difficult to administer. Id.
141. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a
(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The statute requires that aliens prove that they have been
physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986, the day IRCA was
enacted. Id. The regulations later modified this. See infra note 143 and accompanying
text (explaining the change in the regulations).
142. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Specifically, the phrase "brief, casual and innocent"
means a departure lasting no more than 30 days and authorized by the INS subsequent
to May 1, 1987 for a humanitarian purpose. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,205-06 (1987) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(g)).
The definition of the phrase "brief, casual and innocent" has been the subject of
much controversy, in particular in a lawsuit filed in federal court in California. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 55 U.S.L.W. 2569 (9th Cir. April 28, 1987), vacated, 820 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1987). The court held that the original INS view that an
alien's illegal entry into the United States after November 6, 1986 broke the "continuous physical presence" requirement was reasonable. Id. The illegal reentry was, in effect, not innocent. Id. The court's decision was later vacated in light of the final implementing regulations of May 4, 1987. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 820 F.2d
289 (9th Cir. 1987).
The phrase "continuous physical presence" has long been an issue in immigration
law. Compare Fidalgo-Velez v. INS, 697 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding
that an alien's one-day trip to Canada interrupted the seven years of continuous physical presence in the United States required by INA § 244(a)(1), for suspension of deportation) with Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that a
five-day absence in Mexico did not interrupt an alien's continuous physical presence).
See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461 (1963) (stating that Congress did not intend to exclude aliens long residing in the United States for the sole reason of making a
brief trip abroad); see also Matter of Salazar, 17 I & N Dec. 167 (BIA 1979) (holding
that an alien's five-month trip abroad disrupted his permanent residence).
The Supreme Court, in a 1984 decision, held that a provision for an alien's continuous physical presence should be construed strictly and according to plain meaning. See
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 183-84 (1984) (holding that an alien's three-month
absence disrupted her continuous physical presence requirement); see also MorenoAlaniz v. INS, 781 F.2d 1054, 1060 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying the Phinpathya doctrine
to an alien who had departed the United States for a week).
IRCA, however, overruled Phinpathya. Immigration and Nationality Act, §
244(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986); see INS v. Hector, 107 S.Ct. 379,
383 n.7 (1986) (stating that IRCA overruled INS v. Phinpathya);H.R. REP. No. 682,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 124 (1986) (pointing out that the then-proposed provision would overrule Phinpathya). Specifically, new INA section 244(b)(3) (IRCA section 315(b)(3)) provides that an alien shall not be considered to have failed to maintain
a continuous physical presence in the United States if an absence was brief, casual and
innocent, and did not meaningfully interrupt his or her presence. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
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considerable public pressure, the final regulations permit eligibility for
aliens absent from the United States on November 6, 1986 (the date of
enactment of IRCA) or who departed after that date and reentered
before May 1, 1987 (the date the final amnesty regulations took
effect). 143
Fourth, aliens must establish that they are admissible to the United

States as immigrants. 44 Persons who are admissible as immigrants are
not subject to most of the thirty-three grounds for exclusion in the
INA.14 5 IRCA, however, provides the Attorney General the discretion
143. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,208 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(f)).
In the proposed regulations, the INS initially took the position that aliens who were
absent from the country on or after November 6, 1986 were ineligible for amnesty
because their continuous physical presence was broken. 52 Fed. Reg. 8,754 (1987) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a. 1(f)) (proposed Mar. 19, 1987). This position, however,
was widely opposed. See INS Final Regulations, supra note 129, at 517 (pointing out
that the 130 comments the INS received regarding this matter unanimously opposed
the initial INS position). In the final rule the INS modified its position to allow aliens
who were outside the United States on or after November 6, 1986 to apply for legalization if they reentered prior to May 1, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,208 (1987) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(f)).
144. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
145. Id. § 212(a). Section 212 lists the classes of aliens that are excludable from
the United States, including, among others, insane persons, alcoholics, persons afflicted
with a contagious disease, criminals, prostitutes, persons likely to become public
charges, drug offenders, persons who are members of anarchist or communist organizations and are a threat to national security, and persons who assisted in the Nazi persecutions. Id. Some cases have examined the question of "national security risks." See
Makarian v. Turnage, 624 F. Supp. 181, 185 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that an alien
who had a history of recourse to violence and boasted of terrorist affiliations was excludable as a national security threat); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1058
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd per curiam, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987) (holding that an actual
threat to the security of the United States must be present independent of an alien's
membership in a proscribed organization).
IRCA specifically provides that certain grounds for exclusion will not apply to aliens
applying for amnesty. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). These grounds include aliens who entered to work
without Labor Department approval, aliens who entered without a valid passport or
entry document, aliens who entered without a valid preference or employment visa,
aliens unable to read a language, and aliens who are medical school graduates who
have not passed a required exam. Id. § 212(a)(14),(20),(21),(25),(32).
A unique feature of IRCA is its treatment of the public charge ground of exclusion.
As with most other grounds of exclusion, aliens who are likely to become public
charges are ineligible for legalization. See id. § 245A(a)(4)(A) (stating that to qualify
for amnesty a person must be admissible to the United States as an immigrant). However, as with most grounds of exclusion, the Attorney General may waive the public
charge ground when aliens apply for amnesty. Id. § 245A(d)(2)(B)(i). When aliens
apply for permanent residence status eighteen months later, however, the Attorney
General may not waive the public charge ground. Id. § 245A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(ll). IRCA,
however, provides a "special rule" for public charges which states that aliens are not
ineligible for adjustment of status based on the public charge ground of exclusion if
they can demonstrate a history of employment in the United States evidencing self-
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to waive certain grounds for exclusion in individual cases for humanitarian reasons, to assure family unity, or when otherwise in the public
interest.114 Finally, aliens must establish that they have not been convicted of a felony or three or more misdemeanors committed in the
United States; 147 have not assisted in the persecution of any person on
the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; 148 and have registered, if required,
under the Military Selective Service Act. 49

Aliens who meet all of the above requirements and are granted temporary resident status may then apply for adjustment to permanent residence eighteen months after they received temporary residence status. 50 In general, the same timely application,' 5 ' continuous
support without public cash assistance. Id. § 245A(d)(2)(B)(iii). This "special rule" is
available at either the temporary resident stage or at the permanent resident stage.
Wheeler & Zacovic, The Public Charge Ground of Exclusion for Legalization Applicants, 64 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 1046, 1047 (Sept. 14, 1987).
The regulations define "public cash assistance" as income or needs-based monetary
assistance, to include but not limited to supplemental security income, received by an
alien or his or her immediate family members through federal, state, or local programs
designed to meet subsistence levels. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,209 (1987) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l (i)). It does not include assistance in kind, such as food stamps or
public housing; work-related compensation; or certain kinds of medical assistance programs. Id.
The Congressional intent behind the "special rule" was to liberalize the test for public charge exclusion, enable more people to qualify for amnesty, and preclude the use of
federal poverty income guidelines as the sole criteria for determining public charge
excludability. Wheeler & Zacovic, supra, at 1047; cf. Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d
350, 353 (11 th Cir. 1984) (holding that an alien is deportable as a public charge only
if such fate befalls him or her within five years of entering the country).
146. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(d)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(d)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1986). There are certain grounds, however, that the Attorney General may not waive, including those relating to criminals, drug offenders,
persons who are members of certain organizations or a threat to national security, and
persons who participated in the Nazi persecutions. Id. § 245A(d)(2)(B)(ii).
As discussed above, the Attorney General may waive the public charge ground at the
application for legalization but not when the legalized alien who has obtained temporary residence applies for adjustment for permanent residence. Id. §
245A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(Il). Wheeler & Zacovic, supra note 145, at 1047.
147. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Despite the plain meaning of the statute, the INS at
first proposed that a "felony" includes crimes committed outside the United States. 52
Fed. Reg. 8,754, 8,755 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1I) (proposed Mar.
19, 1987). The final regulations, however, restrict the definition to crimes committed in
the United States. 53 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,209 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
245a. 11).
148. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(a)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(a)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
149. Id. § 245A(a)(4)(D).
150. Id. § 245A(b)(I)(A). Arocha, INS Bracesfor Flood of Aliens, Wash. Post,
Feb. 7, 1987, at A8, col. i.
151. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(b)(I)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
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residence,15 2 and admissibility requirements 5 3 are necessary for adjustment to permanent residence status. There is an additional requirement

of "basic citizenship skills" before aliens can obtain permanent residence. 15 ' During the temporary residence period, aliens are authorized
to obtain employment 55 and take brief trips abroad. 5 '
IRCA temporarily disqualifies newly legalized aliens from receiving
certain kinds of public assistance for a period of five years. 57 Specifi-

cally, these aliens are ineligible for any federal program of financial
assistance on the basis of financial need,15 8 any medical assistance

under a state plan approved by the Social Security Act,159 and assistance under the Food Stamp Act of 1977.160 There are, however, some
exceptions to these disqualifications. Aliens who are blind, elderly, or
disabled qualify for some benefits, 61 as do aliens under eighteen years
of age. 162 In addition, certain programs of financial assistance will ap1255a(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); see id. § 245A(f)(2) (providing no review for denials
based on late filings of applications).
152. Id. § 245A(b)(1)(B).

153. Id. § 245A(b)(1)(C).

154. Id. § 245A(b)(1)(D). These citizenship skills include a minimal understanding
of English and a knowledge of United States history and government. Id. §
245A(b)(1)(D)(i).
155. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(b)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,213 (1987) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(n)(3)).
As part of a settlement to Catholic Social Services v. Meese, the INS agreed to
grant work authorization to aliens who plan to file for legalization. INS Agrees to
Temporary Work Authorization for Legalization Applicants, 64 Interpreter Releases
(Fed. Pub.) 376, 376-77 (Mar. 26, 1987). Under the settlement, aliens seeking employment may sign a declaration that they believe they qualify for amnesty and intend to
apply for it. Id. at 376. This work authorization expired on September 1, 1987, after
which the aliens affected were required to conform to the documentary and other requirements of IRCA. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,226 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
274a.11); cf. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Pasadena Independent
School District, 672 F. Supp. 280, 281-82 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (enjoining a school district
from dismissing undocumented alien employees until they exhaust their administrative
remedies under IRCA).
156. Id. § 245A(b)(3)(A). Any travels abroad, however, must be taken with the
intention of returning to the United States to seek permanent residency. Id. The implementing regulations provide that an alien in temporary residency status may not be
absent from the United States for a single thirty-day period or ninety days in the aggregate after he or she received temporary status. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,213 (1987)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(m)(2)).
157. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h) (Supp. IV
1986).
158. Id. § 245A(h)(1)(A)(i).
159. Id. § 245A(h)(1)(A)(ii). This limitation, however, does not apply to emergency services and services for pregnant women. Id. § 245A(h)(3)(B).
160. Id. § 245A(h)(1)(A)(iii).
161. Id. § 245A(h)(2)(B).

162. Id. § 245A(h)(3)(B)(ii).
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ply to newly legalized aliens.16 3
To assist the INS in the amnesty program, IRCA authorizes the
government to enlist help from "qualified designated entities"
(QDEs). 1 " The INS established the requirements for organizations to
qualify as QDEs 6 5 and selected more than 250 QDEs on April 23,
1987.166 Generally, the organizations selected were experienced in
working with and assisting aliens, and included religious, labor, and
farmworker organizations. 6 7 The QDEs have assisted aliens in completing their amnesty applications and accepted completed applications,
which they then forward to the INS.' 68
To implement the amnesty, the INS established 107 "legalization
offices" nationwide to receive and process completed applications.109
163. Id. § 245A(h)(4). Examples of programs under which assistence may be furnished to legalized aliens include the National School Lunch Act, the Child Nutrition
Act of 1966, the Headstart-Follow Through Act, and the Public Health Service Act.
Id. In addition, legalized aliens are eligible for federal student assistance. Education
Department Rules Amnestied Aliens Eligible for Student Loans, 64 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 1083 (Sept. 21, 1987).
164. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986).
165. 52 Fed. Reg. 6,230, 6,233-35 (1987). The types of organizations selected were
described as: "national voluntary agencies and other national organizations; local independent voluntary agencies; community and ethnic organizations; state, county, or municipal organizations; farm labor organizations; associations of agricultural employers;
and other designated persons selected by the Attorney General." Id. at 6233; see 52
Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,209 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(1)) (defining the
term "designated entity").
166. INS Selects QDEs, Sets May I for Final Regs, 64 Interpreter Releases (Fed.
Pub.) 488, 488-89 (Apr. 27, 1987) [hereinafter INS Selects QDEs]. In November
1987, the INS published the list of the 977 QDEs it selected. 52 Fed. Reg. 44,812-24
(1987).
167. INS Selects QDEs, supra note 166, at 488. The organizations selected as
QDEs include the United States Catholic Conference, the American Council for Nationalities Service, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, the Presiding Bishop's
Fund of the Episcopal Church, the Martin Luther King, Jr. Farmworker's Fund, and
the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. Id.
168. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(c)(1)-(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(1)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). See N. MONTWIELER, supra note 1, at 61 (pointing out that
QDEs may only assist the INS in the initial processing of applications-giving advice
and information, and then forwarding the applications to the INS). The INS makes all
decisions on the applications. Id. An important provision in IRCA protects aliens by
providing for confidentiality of the information contained in the amnesty applications.
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5) (Supp. IV
1986). The information cannot be used for any purpose other than to make a determination on the application. Id. § 245A(c)(5)(A).
169. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,191 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 100.4("));
see Arocha, supra note 150, at A8, col. 1 (stating that the INS initially expected to
open 108 legalization offices and hire 2000 new employees).
An alien filing an application for amnesty must pay a fee of $185 per adult and $50
per child, with a family maximum of $420. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,193 (1987) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)); see Thornton, U.S. Urges $185 Alien Amnesty Fee,
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The INS has also conducted a publicity campaign through the mass
media to educate aliens about the amnesty.1 70 The government initially
expected this effort to convince 3.9 million persons to come forward for

the amnesty.17 As the program progressed, however, that estimate was
revised downward.

2

B.

POLICY RATIONALE

Arguments in favor of and against amnesty are varied and impassioned. For years, government officials opposed the concept of a broad
amnesty because it represented an acknowledgment of the failure of
the United States government to control the national borders. By the
Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1987, at A3, col. 1 (reporting the INS proposal on amnesty fees).
But see Barker, "Illegals" Line Up for Amnesty, Wash. Post, May 3, 1987, at D2, col.
1 (reporting on concerns that the amnesty fees are too high for some undocumented
aliens).
Additionally, an alien applying for legalization is required to undergo a medical examination. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(d)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
1255a(d)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1986); Medical Exams Requiredfor Legalization Under
IRCA, 64 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 408 (Apr. 6, 1987). Applicants are also
required to undergo testing for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Arocha,
AIDS Test Exemptions Sought for Some Aliens, Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1987, at C2,
col. 1.
When an alien files an application at a legalization office, the office may make a
decision on it, but the final decision rests with one of four "regional processing facilities"(RPFs). 53 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,192 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.1(t)). An immigrant may appeal a denial of adjustment of status to an "Administrative Appeals Unit" (AAU). Id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(iii)).
Finally, IRCA appropriates $422 million for fiscal year 1987 and S419 million for
fiscal year 1988 to enable the INS to carry out its responsibilities, including the implementation of the legalization program. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 111, 100 Stat. 3359, 3381. In addition, § 204 of IRCA appropriates $ 1 billion to reimburse states for the costs resulting from the amnesty. Id. § 204,
100 Stat. 3405; N. MONTWIELER, supra note 1, at 27.

170. See Thornton, supra note 134, at Al, col. 2 (statement of Greg Leo, INS
Director of Public Affairs) (reporting INS plans to begin a nationwide publicity campaign); N. MONTWIELER, supra note 1, at 61 (describing the kinds of information on
the amnesty that the campaign would disseminate). Title II of IRCA authorizes the
publicity campaign. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(i)
(Supp. IV 1986).
171. Arocha, supra note 150, at A8, col. 1. INS officials hoped for an average of
16,000 persons a day. Id.; see Legalization-TheFirstMonth, 64, Interpreter Releases
(Fed. Pub.) 704 (June 8, 1987) [hereinafter The First Month] (stating that the INS
originally estimated that from two to four million persons would apply for amnesty);
see also Arocha, supra note 150, at A8, col. I (reporting INS official Richard Norton
as describing the program as the "largest experiment ever by the INS").
172. See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing the revised estimates of the number of aliens that will apply for amnesty).
173. See 1985 Senate Hearings,supra note 78, at 281 (statement of Paul S. Egan
of the American Legion). Mr. Egan commented that "[a]mnesty constitutes a departure from basic government obligations to the governed to protect the sanctity of sovereign borders and carefully fashion public policies which promote social well-being with-
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time Congress debated IRCA, however, most concerns focused on the
scope of the amnesty and on whether to delay its implementation until
enforcement mechanisms were in place.1"4
In general, there are two principal arguments against a broad amnesty. The first argument asserts that an amnesty rewards lawbreakers
and penalizes legitimate immigrants. 17 5 The proponents of this argument insist that the law should aid persons who attempt to enter the
United States through legitimate means. Instead, an amnesty rewards
those who enter the country illegally and remain in violation of the law,
thereby eroding respect for law. 78
The second argument, focusing on demographic and environmental
concerns, views an amnesty as encouraging other aliens to enter the
United States illegally.1 7 According to this argument, more aliens
would cross the United States borders because they either misunder17 8
stand what the amnesty represents or anticipate another amnesty.
out exposing the body politic to undue chaos." Id.
Although no longer the case, past arguments against liberal immigration policies at
times advocated the exclusion of immigrants deemed racially or culturally "undesirable." M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 28. Enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965,
which eliminated the discriminatory national origins quotas largely repudiated these
racially based arguments. Id.; see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1182) (Supp. IV 1986) (eliminating national origin quotas).
174. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of a
"triggered amnesty").
175. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 29; SELECTED READINGS, supra note 12, at 235
(statement of Sen. Richard S. Schweiker). Senator Schweiker argued that the amnesty
"puts the government squarely behind the lawbreaker, and, in effect, says,
'[C]ongratulations, you have successfully violated our laws and avoided detection-here is your reward.'" Id.
Morris places opponents of expanded immigration policies historically into three
broad categories: patriotic-nationalistic organizations, such as the Liberty Lobby; certain labor organizations, such as the American Federation of Labor before its merger
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations; and growth limitation organizations,
such as Zero Population Growth and the Federation for American Immigration Reform. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 27-28. But see C. KEELY, U.S. IMMIGRATION &
POLICY ANALYSIS 33-34 (1979) (pointing out that while many unions in organized labor only support partial amnesty, others such as the United Farm Workers support full
amnesty).
Morris makes a similar categorization of supporters of liberal immigration policies:
ethnic groups; liberal religious organizations; progressive and human rights organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Democratic Action; and some labor and business organizations such as the AFL-CIO and the National Association of Manufacturers. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 29.
176. Hearings on S. 2252, supra note 43, at 149 (statement of Rep. Richard C.
White).
177. M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 30.
178. Id.; see R. CONNER, ABOLISHING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 9 (1979) (pamphlet)
(expressing concerns about the possibility that people will perceive that one amnesty
will follow another). Conner argues that there cannot be any hint or hope that an
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Opponents of amnesty also point out that when aliens currently in the
United States gain citizenship after five years as permanent residents,
they will bring in relatives residing in their native countries, thereby
raising the population sharply and straining socioeconomic resources. 70
Advocates of this argument, therefore, favor a narrow, triggered amnesty that does not create perceptions of possible future amnesties.""0
Despite these pressures, Congress decided in favor of a broad amnesty over other alternatives.181 The relatively generous amnesty of
IRCA embodies this concept. There are several reasons why this was
the correct policy choice.
First, at a basic level, an amnesty is the best possible solution given
the other alternatives. SCIRP, for example, considered three possible
responses to the problem of illegal immigration: maintaining the status
quo, massive deportation, and amnesty."' Maintaining the status quo,
in effect ignoring the problem, is not a realistic option. Likewise, a
massive deportation effort is unworkable. In addition to its logistical
and fiscal costs, 183 a massive deportation program carries with it the
possibility of violating the civil rights of many persons, including lawful
residents.1 84 In light of these deficiences of other alternatives, an amnesty is the best possible option.
A broad amnesty directly addresses the problem by eliminating the
amnesty program will be continuing or would become a rolling amnesty for other immigrants. Id.; see also Chiswick, Guidelinesfor the Reform of Immigration Policy, 36 U.
MIAMi L. REV. 893, 927 (1982) (arguing that the SCIRP amnesty recommendations

would increase illegal immigration because of expectations of repeated amnesties).

179. See 1985 Senate Hearings,supra note 78, at 303 (statement of the Environmental Fund) (showing that when aliens are granted amnesty and receive citizenship
after several years, they may seek to bring in between one and four family members).
Depending on how many persons apply for amnesty, anywhere from two million to
thirty-two million additional aliens could eventually enter the United States. Id. For
example, if four million undocumented aliens receive amnesty, and each brings in three
family members, twelve million people will be added to the population. Id.
180. E. Midgley, supra note 33, at 62; see 1985 Senate Hearings,supra note 78, at
303 (citing an Environmental Fund study showing the possible eventual demographic
effects of amnesty). The study concluded that "[tihe United States cannot afford such
a massive influx of people, especially just as our economy is beginning to recover from
a decade of recession. The additional population would further burden our already
over-extended social welfare programs and increase unemployment, making life more
difficult for millions of Americans." Id.
181. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201,
100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3404 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see supra notes
129-72 and accompanying text (describing the amnesty provision under IRCA).
182. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 72-74; Leaf, supra note 27, at 65.
183. South of the Border, supra note 13, at 363-64; see SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 12, at 44 (describing the costs of INS apprehension and deportation
efforts).
184. Leaf, supra note 27, at 65-66.
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"shadow existence" of millions of persons. It is unacceptable in United
States society to have a large underground population living outside the
sanctions and protections of the law. 85 By legalizing the status of these
persons, the government would allow them to contribute more fully to
United States society and would regain control over the borders.1 8
Moreover, the amnesty is a humanitarian measure. 187 Although undocumented aliens are often victims of employer exploitation they are
powerless to change that exploitation because they maintain illegal status. 8 Legal status enables aliens to protect themselves under the law.
Second, a grant of amnesty is an acknowledgment of the partial responsibility of the federal government for allowing the illegal immigration situation to exist.' 8 In the past, the government often encouraged
immigration without considering the long-term effects.' 90 Although the
government did not actively aid the recruitment of aliens, it quietly
tolerated the existence of large numbers of undocumented aliens. 1 1 An
amnesty, therefore, is an overdue acknowledgment of the role of the
government in the current immigration situation.
Third, and perhaps most important, a grant of amnesty is a symbolic
recognition of the contributions that aliens make to United States society. Evidence shows that most undocumented aliens provide revenues
for the federal government in the form of taxes and help to create
185. Fuchs, supra note 4, at 440. President Carter said in 1977: "[Undocumented
aliens'] entire existence would continue to be predicated on staying outside the reach of
government authorities and the law's protection." SELECTED READINGS, supra note 12,
at 125.
186. See 1985 House Legalization Hearings, supra note 69, at 2-9 (statement of
Attorney General Edwin Meese) (indicating that the purpose of amnesty includes
regaining control over the country's borders).
187. See 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 78, at 338 (statement of Most Rev.
Anthony J. Bevilacqua, Chairman of the Committee on Migration and Tourism, National Conference of Catholic Bishops) (describing the amnesty as a humanitarian
measure because it brings hardworking and contributing members of society under the
law's protection); 1985 House Legalization Hearings, supra note 69, at 99 (statement
of Donald H. Larsen, Director, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service) (pointing
out the humane characteristics of a generous amnesty program).
188. See SELECTED READINGS, supra note 12, at 34 (describing the harsh working
conditions and exploitation that many undocumented aliens endure).
189. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 12. The report stated, "[i]n a sense, our
society has participated in the creation of the problem. Many undocumented/illegal
migrants were induced to come to the United States by offers of work from U.S. employers who recruited and hired them under protection of U.S. law." Id. at 13.
190. See Briggs, Nonimmigrant Labor Policy: Future Trend or Aberration? in THE
UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, supra note 26, at 100-02 (describing the Bracero Mexican labor
program as an example of a federal program that encouraged immigration); see also
supra note 21 (describing briefly the Bracero program). See generally C. McWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXICO (1976) (reviewing the Bracero program in depth).
191. Leaf, supra note 27, at 66.
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wealth in the United States. 92 Additionally, most aliens find gainful
employment and, instead of taking jobs away from United States workers, often take the jobs that others are unwilling to accept.'
Finally, there is no evidence that an amnesty leads to detrimental

demographic and socioeconomic effects, as some opponents of amnesty
argue.1 94 Because of the entry and residence requirements, the amnesty

only legalizes the status of persons that have already lived in the
United States for several years.'9 5 It does not invite other aliens to

cross the border, particularly when viewed in conjunction with employer sanctions.' 96 Amnesty essentially "legalizes" an existing status
and benefits the entire country, as the amnesty in Canada

demonstrated.
III.

LESSONS FROM CANADA

To evaluate the potential success of amnesty in the United States, it
is helpful to assess the valuable lessons gained from the Canadian am-

nesty. Before describing the lessons, however, some crucial differences
between the Canadian and United States situations merit discussion.
Perhaps the most important difference is that the number of undocumented aliens in Canada in the early 1970s was much smaller than
that in the United States in the 1980s.197 The United States, therefore,
192. Id. at 77.
193. Piore, supra note 45, at 41-42. Piore divides the jobs of undocumented aliens
into two categories: jobs that complement, or sometimes make possible the "good" jobs
natives hold, and jobs that do not necessarily complement the jobs natives hold, but
which contribute to the standard of living of better-off groups. Id.; see 1985 House
Legalization Hearings, supra note 69, at 995 (statement of Rep. Major R. Owens)
(discounting the "myth" that immigrants take jobs away from American workers);
Hearings on Economic Consequences, supra note 97, at 543 (statement of Frank D.
Bean of the University of Texas) (reporting a study finding that the effects of undocumented Mexican immigration on the wages of native workers are not very large).
194. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 17, at 98-99; see Midgley, supra note 33, at 62
(citing SCIRP conclusions that there is widespread disagreement on the population
effects of immigration). SCIRP concluded that there is no agreement on the most desirable population for the United States, or among environmentalists, over whether increased population has an overall positive or negative effect. Id. SCIRP also concluded
that most studies indicate that undocumented aliens do not place a substantial burden
on social services. Id.; Hearings on Economic Consequences, supra note 97, at 559-60
(statement of Elizabeth Bogen of the New York City Office of Immigrant Affairs)
(stating that the benefits immigrants bring to New York outweigh the detriments).
195. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV
1986) (legalizing the status of aliens who have been present in the United States since
before 1982).
196. See Applebome, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2 (explaining the interplay between
employer sanctions and amnesty as a "carrot and stick" approach).
197. See D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-20 (estimating that 200,000 undocumented aliens in Canada were eligible to apply for amnesty in 1973). The numbers in
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must inevitably tailor any amnesty program to a much larger target
population.
Additionally, the composition of the Canadian undocumented population in 1973 differed from that of the United States in 1986. A large
number of the aliens in Canada came from Europe, the United States,
and the West Indies. 19 8 In addition, undocumented aliens in Canada
were relatively more educated and better off economically than were
immigrants in the United States. 99 A majority of undocumented aliens
in the United States, by contrast, are relatively poor and unskilled
20 0
workers from Mexico and Central America.
The significance of these differences is twofold. First, the educational
level of the aliens in Canada made them more likely to respond to the
amnesty offer.201 Second, the fact that many aliens in Canada spoke
English eliminated a major linguistic barrier. It was much easier to
disseminate information about the amnesty in Canada than it is in the
United States where many undocumented aliens speak little or no
English.20 2
Within the limits of these important differences, the United States
can learn valuable lessons from the Canadian experience with amnesty.
First, as in Canada, the INS must carry out a large-scale and efficient
publicity effort. The success of the Canadian program was due in large
the United States are much higher. See 1985 House Legalization Hearings,supra note
69, at 225 (statement of Jeffrey Passel, Chief, Population and Analysis Staff, Bureau
of the Census) (giving a conservative estimate of 2.5 to 3.5 million undocumented
aliens in the United States).
198. See F. HAwKIN s, supra note 102, at 56 (indicating that from the years 1967
to 1970, the vast majority of immigrants to Canada came from Great Britain, the
United States, Italy, and the West Indies). Many of the United States citizens who
went to Canada were draft resisters opposed to the Vietnam War. Id. at 55; see also
Marr, supra note 104, at 198 (stating that from 1956 to 1974 the great majority of
immigrants to Canada arrived from the "traditional" sending countries of Europe and
North America). The developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Central and South
America contributed 16.3% of Canadian immigrants. Id. Marr makes the point, however, that the changes in the 1960s increased the probability that persons from areas
other than Britain, France, and the United States would emigrate to Canada. Id. at
198-99.
199. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-45.
200. See supra note 94 (describing the age and social characteristics of undocumented aliens in the United States).
201. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-45. North points out that, unlike in the
United States, most aliens in Canada had not had unpleasant encounters with immigration officials. Id. Aliens in the United States may want to avoid further contacts
with the INS, thereby making implementation of the amnesty difficult. Id.
202. See Whelan, supra note 17, at 470-71 (stating that some Mexicans in the
United States appear to be more reluctant than other immigrant groups in adopting
English).
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part to the massive governmental publicity campaign. 0 3
The publicity effort 20 4 in the United States should emphasize two
major factors for the amnesty program to succeed. The publicity cam-

paign must first overcome the language barrier, which is a considerable
obstacle. 20 5 A campaign must also convince aliens of the good will of

the government. Because most undocumented aliens have attempted to
avoid the government since their arrival in the United States, it is unlikely that they will suddenly trust the government.200 Only a meaning-

ful message that acknowledges the difficulties of the past will gain the
trust of the undocumented population.

Second, seeking assistance from community and ethnic organizations
that have contact with undocumented aliens 20 7 would help overcome
both the linguistic barrier and the mistrust that many aliens feel toward the government. 20 8 The Canadian effort to enlist the help of ethnic organizations and the media directly contributed to the success of

its program.20 9 In the United States, therefore, the INS should actively
seek the assistance of such organizations in implementing the amnesty.
Moreover, extensive cooperation among government officials, political parties, the public, and the media contributed to the success of the
Canadian amnesty. 210 Whereas the amnesty in Canada enjoyed nation-

wide support, 1 ' in the United States the amnesty generates considera203. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-24-A-25. North describes how the Minister
of Manpower and Immigration, Robert Andras, launched the publicity campaign
within 48 hours with the theme, "make our country your country." Id. Andras held
press conferences, made speeches, and appeared on radio and television talk shows. Id.
Individual immigration officials discussed the program on radio and television and handled anonymous calls from persons seeking information regarding the amnesty. Id.
204. See Thornton, supra note 134, at I, col. 2 (reporting that the nationwide advertising campaign to promote the IRCA amnesty was to begin in March and April,
1987).
205. See South of the Border, supra note 13, at 365 (stating that the language
constraint is a major barrier to the success of an amnesty program).
206. Id.
207. See Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 70-71 (mentioning legalization efforts by
other countries where ethnic and community organizations rendered assistance); see
also AMERICA, Nov. 15, 1986, at 295 (urging the INS to cooperate with religious agencies that help undocumented aliens).
208. South of the Border, supra note 13, at 366; see U.S. Can Learnfrom Legalization Experiences of Other Countries, INS Told, 63 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.)
1152, 1153 (Dec. 15, 1986) (advocating outreach to local ethnic groups and voluntary
organizations to try to overcome mistrust of a country's immigration agency). This
approach worked well in Canada. Id.
209. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-25.
210. Id. North described the Canadian amnesty as a "political honeymoon from
start to finish." Id. at A-45; ROBINSON REPORT, supra note 128, at 33.

211.

ROBINSON REPORT,

supra note 128, at 33.
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ble controversy.212 To implement the amnesty successfully in the
United States, all sectors of society must lend their support.
A high degree of motivation and morale from Canadian immigration
officials served as another important factor in the Canadian success. 13
In the United States, the unfortunate image of a demoralized and inefficient INS still prevails.2 4 For the amnesty program to succeed, this
will have to change. One suggestion to accomplish this is to provide the
INS with the financial and personnel resources it needs to effectively
implement the amnesty.2"5 Another suggestion is to improve the management and planning operations of the agency. 1 ' In any case, it is
crucial for the success of amnesty that the INS improve its efficiency
and operations.
Perhaps the final lesson provided by Canada is that administering an
amnesty program for a large underground population is very difficult.
Given that the conditions in Canada were more conducive to amnesty
than in the United States and yet resulted in numbers far below those
expected, there should be no illusions about the amnesty in the United
States. If enough attention and resources are provided, through
thoughtful and careful administration, amnesty under IRCA will
succeed.
IV.

PROGRESS REPORT

At the time of this writing, the amnesty program under IRCA is
three-quarters of the way to completion. The application period for amnesty is scheduled to end on May 4, 1988.217 Perhaps as a reflection of
the controversial nature of amnesty, there have been widely different
evaluations of the program. 1 8 While some have declared it to be
largely a success, others have expressed concerns that the amnesty will
212. See N. MONTWIELER, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that the sharp criticism
levelled at the first Simpson-Mazzoli bill gave an indication of the controversy that the
legislation engendered in the following years).
213. D. NORTH, supra note 11, at A-46-A-47.
214. See M. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 87-89 (describing reports of the INS as
inadequately equipped, overwhelmed by its work, deeply demoralized, and in a state of
disarray).
215. Id. at 138-39; INS Budget Hearings, supra note 100, at 62-63 (statement of
Charles Murphy of the INS).
216. Id.
217. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190, 16,209 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a)).
218. See Arocha, Immigration Law Backer Declares Success amid Others' Doubts,
Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1987, at A12, col. I (reporting that while some are praising IRCA
a year after Congress passed it, others are criticizing it for its detrimental effects on
aliens).
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fail because many aliens will not apply. 219 Because of this latter view,
some members of Congress have proposed an extension of the application period beyond May 4, 1988.220

Observers of the amnesty program focus their attention, of course, on
the number of undocumented aliens that have come forward to apply
for legalization. This number, however, is contingent on a number of
factors that one must initially evaluate. There are at least six relevant
factors: the INS campaign to publicize and promote the amnesty program; the perception by aliens of the INS and any changes in that
perception; the role of the QDEs; the twin problems of fees and documentation; the level of fraud that has occurred in the program; and the
issue of family unity. The remainder of this Comment examines each
of these factors.
A.

THE NUMBERS

The legalization program began very slowly. 221 A month after the
program began on May 5, 1987 only about 69,000 aliens had applied
for amnesty.222 Within two months, however, applications increased
sharply and by early August, three months into the program, over
300,000 applications had been filed nationwide. 223 This averaged out to
219. Id. (citing Rep. Charles E. Schumer, who found the amnesty program to be a
"greater success than Congress ever thought it would be"); see also Montalvo, INS
Happy with Alien Law, so Far, Miami Herald, Oct. 10, 1987, at 3D, col. I (reporting
generally favorable INS views on IRCA as a whole). But see Rodriguez, Amnesty
Proves Insufficient, L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, Part V, at 5, col. 3 (criticizing the INS's
implementation of the amnesty and advocating a one-year extension of the application
period). But cf. Meissner, Don't Extend Amnesty; Just Make it Work-Now, L.A.
Times, Aug. 2, 1987, Part V, at 5, col. 4 (taking the position that the amnesty program
can work without extension).
220. See infra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining the proposals for an
extension of the application period).
221. See Applebome, Amnesty Programfor Illegal Aliens Gaining Momentum,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (stating that after a slow start applications for
the amnesty program have increased); LaFranchi, Slow Response to Amnesty, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 17, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (reporting that more than a month into
the amnesty, fewer applications than expected have been filed nationwide). But see
Ramos & Holley, INS "Ecstatic" Over Stream of Applicants for Amnesty, L.A.
Times, May 7, 1987, Part I, at 3, col. 3 (reporting that INS officials are happy over the
early numbers of amnesty applicants).
222. See The First Month, supra note 171, at 704, n.l (stating that as of June 4,
1987, 70,705 applications had been filed, 69,299 under the main legalization program
and 1,406 under the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program).
223. Braun, Momentum Builds for Immigration Amnesty Program, L.A. Times,
Aug. 2, 1987, Part I, at 3, col. 1; see Hernandez, Amnesty Sign-Ups Beginning to
Climb, L.A. Times, June 12, 1987, Part I, at 1, col. 1 (noting the sharp rise in applications in June).
It is important to remember that this number represents applications filed under both
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about 40,000 applications a week, up from 11,000 a week in May
1987.224 About ninety-eight percent of the applications had been rec-

ommended for approval by the legalization offices accepting the
applications.22 5
By October 1987, almost halfway through the amnesty program, the

number of applications had risen to about 670,000 nationwide.220 Although the rise in the number was encouraging, by this point some expressed doubts that the INS would accomplish its initial estimate of
two to four million applications.227 By early November 1987, at the
program's halfway point, less than one million persons had applied for
amnesty.228 As the end of 1987 drew near, however, the rate of applications decreased to about 30,000 a week. 229 At that rate, less than two
million applications will have been filed by the cutoff date. 230 By early
31
1988, 904,000 applications had been filed.1

As the program neared the three-quarter point to completion, applications increased only modestly. 232 About a quarter of the applications
the main legalization program and the SAW program. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (briefly describing the SAW program under IRCA).
Often the total legalization applications numbers given in news sources in this section
reflect applications under both the main legalization program and the SAW legalization program. Whenever possible, this Comment will distinguish between the totals for
each program.
224. Applebome, supra note 221, at 1, col. 2. The most weekly applications thus
far, 64,574, were filed during one week at the end of August. Applebome, Amnesty
Requests by Aliens Decline, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Applebome II].
225. Applebome II, supra note 224, at 1, col. 1.
226. CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 21. A total of about 800,000 persons had applied under both the main legalization program and the SAW program. Id.; see Vrazo,
Amnesty Program Falling Short, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 7, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (reporting a total of about 800,000 aliens applying for legalization); see also Legalization
- The Fifth Month, 64 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 1021 (Sept. 4, 1987) [hereinafter The Fifth Month] (reporting that by September 2, 1987, aliens had filed 620,456
applications, 527,451 under the main legalization program and 93,005 under the SAW
program). Of the total 800,000 applications received, INS had given final approval to
60,000 of them. Griego, Alien Law Purrs Along, Agency Says, Denver Post, Oct. 7,
1987, at 3C, col. I.
227. See Austin American-Statesman, Sept. 19, 1987, at B3, col. I (statement of
Rep. John Bryant) (stating that an initial estimate of two million applicants was too
optimistic). But see Griego, supra note 226, at 3C, col. I (reporting that some INS
officials estimate that two million aliens will apply for amnesty).
228. Solis & Yoshihashi, Immigration Law Cuts Illegal Border Crossing, but it's
no Panacea, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1987, at I, col. 1.
229. Applebome II, supra note 224, at 1, col. 1.
230. See id. (reporting doubts that the two million minimum in applications will be
reached).
231. Id. The total number of amnesty applications filed by early 1988, including
the SAW program, was 1.2 million. Id.
232. See Legalization-The Ninth Month, 65 Interpreter Releases (Fed. Pub.) 73
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had been fully reviewed and ninety-eight percent had been approved. 2
By early March 1988, with two months left in the program, the INS
had received 1,036,108 applications.234
The applications have been filed unevenly throughout the country.
About sixty percent have been filed in the western region of the INS. 3
The INS southern region has also been quite successful in encouraging
applications. 238 Few applications have been filed in the northern and
eastern regions, 237 a fact that has surprised and disappointed INS officials.238 INS legalization offices in major eastern region cities with
large immigrant populations, like New York and Washington, D.C.,
have received relatively few applications. 239 By contrast, aliens in the
major cities of the southwest region have applied in large numbers.24 0
As expected, by far the largest group of aliens applying for amnesty
have been Mexican.241 Mexicans have filed about seventy percent of
(Jan. 25, 1988) [hereinafter The Ninth Month] (reporting a total by January 20, 1988
of about 939,000 applications, only about 35,000 more than than two weeks earlier).
233. Id. at 74.
234. Telephone interview with the press information office of the INS Central Office in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 7, 1988). The total number of applications received,
including those in the SAW program, was 1,335,915. Id.; see Applebome, Amnesty
Sale.: The Medium is the Tortilla, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1988, at 1,col. 5 (reporting
that INS officials expect only 1.35 million aliens to apply for amnesty).
235. The Fifth Month, supra note 226, at 1021; see Vrazo, supra note 226, at 1,
col. 2 (reporting that 80% of the applications have been filed in the western and southwestern regions of the country); Getlin, Over 800,000 Aliens Seek Amnesty; Arrests
Dip 30%, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, Part I, at 1, col. I (stating that the western states,
southern California in particular, show the greatest number of applications). But cf.
Burling, 5,000 Amnesty Bids Yield FourApprovals, Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 19,
1987, at 7, col. I (reporting that only 4 of 5000 applications filed in the Denver area
have received final approval).
There are four INS "regions" (northern, southern, eastern, and western) in the
United States, each headed by a regional commissioner. T. ALEINMKOr & D. MARTIN,
supra note 7, at 83.
236. See The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 74 (reporting that 23% of applications have been filed in the southern region); Montalvo, 33.000 Aliens in FloridaFile
Amnesty Papers, Miami Herald, Aug. 3, 1987, at BI, col. 1 (stating that large numbers of aliens in Florida have applied). But see Semien, Amnesty Program Moving
Slowly in La., Sunday Advocate (Baton Rouge), Aug. 9, 1987, at IA, col. 1 (reporting
that few aliens in Louisiana have applied).
237. The Ninth Month, supra note 232 at 74; see Randle, Immigrants Slow to
Seek Amnesty, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, Sept. 21, 1987, at Cl, col. 1 (reporting
that in Minnesota few aliens have filed for legalization).
238. Id.
239. Priest, D.C. Area Far Behind Other Regions in Immigrant Applicants, Wash.
Post, Oct. 15, 1987, at DI, col. 2; Hoffman, Amnesty Gets Little Response Among
Illegals in New York, Dallas Times Herald, Sept. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
240. Id.
241. The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 74; see Delvecchio & Garcia, Preying
on Aliens' Dreams of Citizenship, San Francisco Chronicle, July 27, 1987, at 4, col. 1
(showing a chart depicting Mexicans as the largest group of applicants in the San
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the applications nationwide.242 The fact that many Mexicans live in the
southwest region of the INS, where most applications have been filed,
reflects this fact. By contrast, the number of Asians applying has been
relatively low, a fact that has surprised INS officials.243
It appears that the amnesty program will have difficulty meeting its
numerical goals. By May 4, 1988, the two million minimum number of
applications may be reached, but it is unlikely that the number will go
much higher than this. By late 1987 there were calls for an extension
of the amnesty program and two bills providing for such an extension
were introduced in Congress.244
A.

THE

INS PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN

Although many observers considered a well-run publicity campaign
as the most important factor for a successful amnesty, 2" 5 the INS publicity effort began slowly.2 46 The INS did not begin accepting bids for a
campaign from publicity firms until January 1987247 and did not award
a contract until April 1987.248 The campaign has involved advertisements through various kinds of media, including television, radio, and
the print media.2 49
Francisco area); see also D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, THE LEGALIZATION
A THIRD QUARTER ASSESSMENT 88a (1988) (displaying a chart showing
the estimated legalization applications, grouped by nationality, received by the INS as
of Jan. 8, 1988). As of this date, the five nationalities with the greatest number of
applicants were Mexico, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, and the Philippines. Id.
242. The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 74.
243. San Antonio Light, Aug. 17, 1987, at A4, col. 1; see Vrazo, supra note 226, at
1, col. 2 (stating that the number of Asians applying for amnesty has been lower than
expected).
244. H.R. 3816, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 133 CONG. REC. HI 1,866 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 1987); S. 2015, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 CONG. REC. S 283-88 (daily ed. Jan 28,
1988). The bills, introduced by Rep. Charles Schumer in the House and Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy in the Senate, call for a one-year extension of the application period. See
D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, supra note 241, at 105-11 (discussing the Schumer and Kennedy bills); see also Pasztor & Hoffman, Government Flaws Hamper Success of Immigration Reforms, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 20, 1987, at A21,
col. I (reporting Rev. Theodore Hesburgh's statement arguing that aliens should be
given more time to apply for amnesty).
COUNTDOWN:

245. See D. MEISSNER & D.

PAPADEMETRIOU,

supra note 241, at 10 (stating that

one of the central lessons from other countries that have had amnesty programs is the
importance of an extensive publicity effort).
246. Montalvo, Ads on Immigration Law Don't Reach Aliens, Critics Say, Miami
Herald, Sept. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
247. Id.
248. Id. Montana & Solis, INS Starts Media Campaignto PromoteNew Amnesty
Law, Improve its Image, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1987, at 19, col. 1. A $10.7 million
contract for the publicity campaign was awarded to three public relations and marketing firms in April 1987. Id.
249. Montalvo, supra note 246, at 1, col. 1.
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The main goal of the publicity campaign has been to change the

image of the INS in the minds of undocumented aliens."5 Many observers viewed distrust of the agency as a potential major barrier to a

successful amnesty.251 As discussed below, the publicity campaign has
25 2
at least partly succeeded in convincing some aliens to trust the INS.

Partly as a result of its late start, however, the campaign has not
reached a large number of aliens. 253 There is apparently a large segment of the undocumented population that is misinformed about the
specifics of the amnesty. 2 " A main reason for this is the campaign's
focus on Spanish speaking aliens. 255 Although this emphasis was logical
because most of the undocumented population is from Mexico and
Central America, it has meant that large communities of non-Spanish
speaking undocumented aliens have not been reached. 2 10 This has been

especially true in New York City, with its diversity of immigrant
groups.257

It appears that the publicity campaign has succeeded only in part.
While the INS may have a somewhat better image in the minds of
many aliens, the slow start of the campaign and its failure to reach
many aliens have been major problems and have contributed to the low
numbers.
250. See McCarthy, Aliens Reportedly Fail to Learn of Amnesty, Buffalo News,
July 21, 1987, at D5, col. 1 (quoting several observers as saying that few aliens will
apply for amnesty unless the INS changes its image); see also Ramos, Amnesty Ad
Campaign Hopes to Heat Up Cool Response, L.A. Times, June 25, 1987, Part I, at 36,
col. 1 (stating that a focus of the publicity campaign will be to persuade aliens that the
INS is sincere).
251. Montana & Solis, supra note 248, at 19, col. 1.
252. See infra note 265 and accompanying text (reporting a more favorable view of
the INS for some aliens).
253. See Pasztor, Rural,Border Turnout Hurt by a Dearth of Information, Dallas
Times Herald, Sept. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 1 (reporting that outside the large cities in
Texas, information on the amnesty is hard to obtain); see also Applebome II, supra
note 224, at 1, col. 1 (reporting that the publicity campaign has not reached many
aliens in New York City).
254. Montalvo, supra note 246, at 1, col. 1.
255. See Hoffman, supra note 239, at Al, col. I (stating that public education
efforts have concentrated on messages in English and Spanish).
256. Id.; see Montalvo, supra note 246, at 1, col. I (reporting that after a dismal
response to the amnesty from aliens in New York City, the city established its own
multilanguage hotline).
257. Hoffman, supra note 239, at Al, col. 1. Unlike cities in the Southwest, where
most of the undocumented population is Hispanic, New York's undocumented population is extremely diverse. See id. (pointing out that New York is believed to have a
population from as many as 82 countries); see also Applebome II, supra note 224, at 1,
col. 1 (mentioning that the diverse nature of alien communities on the East Coast has
made it more difficult to publicize the amnesty).
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B. THE INS AND THE QDEs
When the amnesty program began in May 1987, some predicted that
the negative perception of the INS by many aliens would hinder the
program. 5" Many argued that because many undocumented aliens
knew the INS as the government agency that traditionally sought to
deport them, they would be reluctant to trust it. 259 As the amnesty has
progressed, however, it appears that fear of the INS has not been as
great a barrier as many initially thought."' This is not to say that
some aliens have not stayed away from amnesty because of fears of the
INS. Negative perceptions of the agency still remain in the minds of
many undocumented aliens and have been a factor in their decisions of
whether to seek amnesty. 61
On the other hand, many aliens have not allowed fears of the INS to
prevent them from applying for amnesty. 62 Most aliens that have decided to file applications have done so with the agency itself rather than
with the QDEs. 26 3 Throughout the program, the INS itself has received
about eighty percent of all amnesty applications.2 64 This suggests that
campaign, in
the INS has been partly successful, through its publicity
2 5
agency.
the
trust
can
they
that
aliens
many
convincing
258. Applebome II, supra note 224, at 1, col. 1.
259. Uzelac, Many Aliens Sign Up, but Others Remain Wary, Bait. Sun, May 6,
1987, at 3A, col. 1. One observer argued that asking undocumented aliens to trust the
INS was like "asking Indians to trust Custer." Montana & Solis, supra note 248, at
19, col. 1.
260. See Griego, supra note 226, at 3C, col. 1 (quoting INS Associate Commissioner Richard Norton as saying that fear of the INS has not been a factor in the first
month of the amnesty program); CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 3 (arguing that the fact
that the majority of applications have been filed directly with the agency reflects a
certain lack of fear of the INS).
261. Howe, Strong Fears Remain over New Immigration Law, N.Y. Times, Aug.
2, 1987, at A50, col. 3; see Wildes, Illegal Aliens: Is it Safe to Come out of Hiding?,
Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1987, at 20, col. 3 (stating that many aliens do not trust the
INS).
262. See Vrazo, supra note 226, at 1, col. 2 (stating that fear of the INS has been
less of a factor than originally thought, especially among Mexicans); Mathews, Successes Outweigh Failures in First Year of Amnesty Program, Wash. Post, Nov. 6,
1987, at A13, col. 1 (noting a statement by David North of the Center for Immigration
Studies recognizing a lack of "alleged distrust of INS").
263. Mathews, supra note 262, at A13, col. 1; see CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 25
(stating that less than 20% of applications have been filed with QDEs). But cf. Pasztor
& Hoffman, CriticsSay Push to Cope with Amnesty Sapping INS, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 20, 1987, at A23, col. 1 (reporting that the administration of the amnesty has
strained many sectors of the INS).
264. CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 25.
265. See Applebome, supra note 221, at 1, col. 2 (citing Rep. Charles Schumer as
stating that for some amnesty applicants, the INS has turned from the enemy into
something else).
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The gain for the INS, however, appears to have been a loss for the
QDEs. At the start of the program, many predicted that the majority
of applications would be filed through the QDEs. 6 6 Statistics suggest,
however, that fewer than one fourth of all applications have gone
2 7
through QDEs.
The reasons for these results are still unclear. Many QDEs place the
blame on the INS, alleging that the agency has made the process too
complicated" 8 and has been hostile to the QDEs.20 0 In response, the
INS complains that the QDEs were caught unprepared and have been
slow to submit completed applications. 70 These opposing views have
created a tense atmosphere in which the QDEs and the INS have exchanged accusations to the detriment of the entire program. 7 1 This
tension has also complicated the process and contributed to the low
numbers.
C.

FEES, DOCUMENTATION, AND FRAUD

Throughout the legalization program, the fees set by the INS have
266. Holley, INS Says it's Ready; Critics Expect Chaos, L.A. Times, May 3,
1987, Part I, at 1, col. 6; see Devall, Agencies are Battling over Aliens Registration,
Chicago Tribune, Aug. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (stating that initial plans called for 80% of
applications to come from the QDEs).
267. See The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 73 (reporting that about 20% of
applications have come from QDEs); see also Devall, supra note 266, at 1, col. 4 (stating that many aliens have received the message that they do not need to go through the
QDEs). But see Braun, supra note 223, Part I, at 3, col. I (stating that while some
QDEs have not filed many applications, others have been extremely busy).
268. Howe, From New York Lawyers, Advice for Aliens, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1987, at ASO, col. 3. Many QDEs complain that because the INS has failed to provide
clear guidelines in many areas, the QDEs have been unsure whether to submit certain
applications that deal with sensitive issues, such as the amount of documentary proof
needed or the question of family unity. Schrieberg, Immigration: Meeting of Minds on
Promoting Amnesty, San Diego Union, July 19, 1987, at C7, col. 1; see Fritze, 00fcials Say Unpredictable Process Scares Aliens Away, Dallas Times Herald, July 28,
1987, at Al, col. I (maintaining that the INS has been inconsistent in amnesty
determinations).
269. Devall, supra note 266, at 1, col. 4 (stating that some QDEs are accusing the
INS of taking an anti-QDE stand because many of the organizations have raised con-

cerns about the amnesty program); D.

MEISSNER

& D.

PAPADEIETRIOU,

supra note

241, at 63-64 (citing the change by the INS of the agreement it had originally made
with the QDEs as a major disruption in the preparations for the amnesty). The change
in agreement between the INS and the QDEs involved the reimbursement structure
that the INS was to use to compensate the QDEs for assisting in gathering amnesty
applications. Id. at 64.
270. Braun, supra note 223, Part I, at 3, col. I; see D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, supra note 241, at 65 (stating that as a result of various factors many QDEs
were late in preparing for the amnesty).
271. Devall, supra note 266, at 1, col. 4; see Meissner, supra note 219, Part V, at
5, col. 4 (denouncing the tense relations between the INS and the QDEs).

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 3:145

been a subject of controversy. 2 Many have argued that the fees ($185
per person and $420 per family) set by the INS have been unfair to
low-income undocumented aliens.1 73 When these fees are added to
medical examination costs and possibly lawyers' fees, the cost of filing
an application for many aliens is considerable.274 In response some
groups have established loans and funds to help aliens pay the fees. 78
A larger problem for many aliens has been obtaining the proper documents to prove their stay in the United States.2 76 At the start of the
amnesty program, some foresaw this problem for many undocumented
aliens, who have spent their entire lives in the United States avoiding
the kind of "paper trail" that would now enable them to prove that
they qualify for amnesty. 277 Unclear guidelines from the INS as to
what forms of documentation it requires have compounded the problem. 278 As the amnesty program enters its final phase, this problem is
likely to worsen because aliens who have not yet filed applications for
lack of documentation may file anyway to meet the deadline. These
applications are likely to not be as well documented as the ones that
272. See supra note 169 (discussing the fees set by the INS in the amnesty
program).
273. Rodriguez, Legalization Gets an Unjust Twist, L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 1987,
Part II, at 5, col. 4; see Berger, Mugavero Assails High Fees for Illegal Aliens, N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1987, at D28, col. 4 (quoting Bishop Francis J. Mugavero of the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn as saying that the amnesty fees are burdensome for
aliens).
274. Vrazo, supra note 226, at 1, col. 2.
275. See Danini, INS Considers Fundfor Aliens, Laredo Morning Times, July 20,
1987, at IA, col. I (reporting that the INS in Texas is considering establishing a fund
to help amnesty applicants pay the fees); Barfield, Amnesty-Processing Loans Offered,
The Tribune (San Diego), Aug. 10, 1987, at 1, col. I (reporting that loans are being
offered to aliens in the San Diego area to help cover the amnesty costs).
276. Hoffman, supra note 239, at Al, col. i; Applebome, supra note 221, at i, col.
2.
277. See supra note 136 (discussing the types of documentation that aliens can use
in the application for amnesty). One observer points out that families may not experience difficulty producing the proper documentation because they usually have been
renting a house and paying utility bills, as opposed to many individual aliens. Malkowski, Workers Leaving Life in Shadows, San Antonio Express News, Aug. 4, 1987, at
9A, col. 2.
278. Lyall, Alien-Amnesty Snag: Finding Proper Papers, N.Y. Times, June 18,

1987, at BI, col. 2; see D.

MEISSNER

& D.

PAPADEMETRIOU,

supra note 241, at 45

(stating that documentation issues have been a persistent problem throughout the amnesty program); Fritze, supra note 268, at Al, col. I (reporting that the INS legalization offices have been inconsistent in which types of documentation they will consider);
see also The Sunday Advocate (Baton Rouge), Aug. 9, 1987, at 12A, col. 2 (reporting
that aliens are not applying for legalization because the documentation process is too
difficult). Some employers have also hindered aliens by refusing to help them gather
documentation. Montalvo, Employers Snarl Amnesty Program, Miami Herald, Aug.
10, 1987, at BI, col. 1.
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came before, and the INS must decide whether to approve them. 270
Another problem that may increase as the legalization program
winds down is the use of fraudulent documents. 2 10 Fraud has been a
problem in the legalization program, although not as serious as some
originally feared.28 " As expected, the problem of obtaining documentation has led to a proliferation of fraudulent documents purporting to
show that the alien has resided in the United States for the requisite
period of time.28 2 A large extent of the fraud problem, however, seems
to be in the SAW program rather than in the main legalization program,28 3 which is operating with less fraud than expected.2e
D.

FAMILY UNITY

The issue of family unity has perhaps been the most serious problem
with the legalization program. 28 5 The problem arises when a person
qualifies for amnesty but his or her family members do not.u0 In these
situations, the person faces the difficult dilemma of whether to come
forward for amnesty and take the risk that his or her family may have
279. Cf. Lyall, supra note 278, at BI, col. 2 (reporting that many QDEs have filed
only applications that contain enough documentation to ensure approval); Braun and
Hernandez, Immigration Law Impact in Doubt, L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1987, Part I, at
1, col. 6 (stating that many expect a last minute rush to file applications).
280. See CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 23 (pointing out that the best amnesty
applications were filed first).
281. Id.; see The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 78 (reporting that the INS has
about 40 fraud investigations under way); see also Brannigan, Amnesty Programfor
Illegal Immigrants Spurs Increase in Fraudulent Documents, Wall St. J., Jan. 25,
1988, at 33, col. 4 (stating that the market for fraudulent documents purporting to
prove residence has become quite lucrative).
282. McDonnell, 3 Accused of Fraudin Amnesty Application, L.A. Times, Aug.
15, 1987, Part I, at 28, col. 1; see Montalvo, INS Launches Crackdown on Amnesty
Fraud, Miami Herald, Nov. 7, 1987, at ID, col. 5 (reporting that as a response to
rampant fraud, the INS is taking stronger measures).
Another fraud-related problem involves the exploitation of many amnesty seekers by
unscrupulous individuals looking to make money. Delvecchio & Garcia, supra note
241, at 4, col. 1. At times, an undocumented alien will turn over his or her documentary proof and money to one of these individuals thinking that they will be filed. Id.
The individual will then abscond with the money and documents. Id.
283. CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 23; see Tricarico, Widespread Alien Fraud
Cited by INS, L.A. Herald Examiner, Nov. 5, 1987, at Al, col. 5 (reporting a high
incidence of fraud in agricultural worker applications); see also The Ninth Month,
supra note 232, at 78 (reporting that between June 1 and October 31, 1987, as many
as half of the SAW applications filed in Florida may have been fraudulent).
284. CIS PAPER, supra note 84, at 23.
285. Applebome II, supra note 224, at 1, col. 1; see D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, supra note 241, at 36 (stating that the family unity issue has become the most
polarized of the disagreements between the INS and immigrant advocates).
286. Hernandez, Qualifyingfor Amnesty-A House Divided by Law, L.A. Times,
May 25, 1987, Part I, at 1, col. 1.
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to leave the country, or to not apply for amnesty, keep the family together, and remain in an illegal status. 87 Many aliens have chosen the
latter and have not applied for amnesty.2""
In October 1987, the INS clarified its position as to what would happen to ineligible family members of applicants for amnesty. 2 9 The
agency announced that it would not deport alien children who do not
qualify for amnesty if both parents qualify. 290 If only one parent qualifies, however, the INS may still deport the children as well as the ineligible spouse. 91
The issue of family unity has been controversial throughout the amnesty program. In October 1987, the Senate tabled a proposal that
would have allowed ineligible spouses and children to remain in the
United States with a qualifying spouse if they were residing in the
country when IRCA became effective.2 92 The INS October modification regarding children was inadequate and many aliens are still not
"
applying because they fear that the INS will deport family members. 98
CONCLUSION
Although, as of the date of this writing, the amnesty program is not
yet complete, one can already assess whether the lessons of the Canadian amnesty were learned and, on a broader level, whether the IRCA
amnesty is likely to succeed.
Perhaps the amnesty program in the United States started out at a
disadvantage compared to the Canadian program. One of the factors
for the success of the Canadian amnesty was the broad support it received from all sectors of Canadian society.29 4 In the United States, on
the other hand, amnesty has always been a controversial topic 95
287. Arocha, Aliens Wary of Amnesty, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1987, at Cl, col. 6.
288. See Corchado, INS Expected to Ease Amnesty Rules to Avoid Splitting Immigrant Families, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1987, at 2, col. 3 (reporting that many aliens
have not applied for amnesty because of the family unity issue).
289. The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 75; Arocha, supra note 287, at Cl, col.

6.
290. Getlin, Ineligible Children Face Deportation, INS Says, L.A. Times, Oct. 22,
1987, Part I, at 1, col. 2; Baltimore Sun, Oct. 22, 1987, at 21A, col. 4. But see id.
(reporting Rep. Romano Mazzoli's opinion that because Congress intended IRCA to be

compassionate, children should not be deported under any circumstances).
291. Getlin, supra note 290, Part I, at 1, col. 1.
292. S. 1394, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 894, 133 CONG. REc. S13727-39 (1987);
Miami Herald, Oct. 8, 1987, at 12A, col. 2.
293. The Ninth Month, supra note 232, at 75; D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU,

supra note 241, at 36.

294. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (stating that the Canadian
amnesty had nationwide support).
295. See D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, supra note 241, at 1 (stating that
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Partly because of this atmosphere of controversy, the program began

slowly and has not run as smoothly as possible.9
There were, however, two other important lessons from the Canadian
amnesty that have not been fully reflected in the IRCA amnesty. Perhaps the most important of these was the importance of a well-run public education campaign. 97 Because the Canadian amnesty operated in
a short time frame, 9 8 it was crucial that the publicity campaign begin
quickly and progress effectively. Although the amnesty in the United
States is a year-long effort, the publicity campaign should be no less
crucial.
Unfortunately, the INS campaign has been largely unsuccessful. The
delay in starting the campaign was a major problem. 99 It is inexcusable that the INS waited so long to begin advertising its massive and
long-awaited amnesty program. Subsequent problems with reaching
certain groups of aliens have also hindered the program.3 0 The result
is that large numbers of aliens have not received the amnesty message
and, therefore, have not applied.3""
On the positive side, the INS campaign has been partly successful in
overcoming the language barrier and in reaching many Spanish speaking aliens. 0 2 The program may have worked too well on this point,
however, as it has not reached many non-Spanish speakers. 3 Additionally, the publicity campaign has succeeded, at least in part, in overcoming some aliens" distrust of the INS.3°
few issues evoke more emotion in the United States than immigration).
296. See id. (observing that the deep disagreements on legalization have carried
over into the implementation of the program, pitting two traditional antagonists, the
INS and the immigrant-assistance community, against each other).
297. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the effort to publicize
the Canadian amnesty); see also D. MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, supra note 241,
at 10 (maintaining that a central lesson to be learned from the legalization programs of
other countries is the importance of a well-run publicity campaign).
298. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (stating that the Canadian amnesty program lasted only 60 days).
299. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (describing the slow start of
the INS publicity effort); see also Ramos, Critics Label I I th-Hour Amnesty Publicity
Push as Too Little, Too Late, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1988, Part II, at 1, cal. 1 (reporting that many view the last-minute publicity effort of the INS as inadequate).
300. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (describing the INS publicity
effort and how it has failed to reach certain aliens).
301. Montalvo, supra note 246, at 1, col. I.
302. See supra note 255 and accompanying text (discussing the publicity campaign's focus on Spanish speaking aliens).
303. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (maintaining that large numbers of non-Spanish speaking aliens have not received enough information on
legalization).
304. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text (discussing how the publicity
effort has succeeded somewhat in changing the image of the INS in the minds of some
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A second major lesson from the Canadian amnesty was the high
level of cooperation between the government and the ethnic and community organizations. 305 The government enlisted the help of many
such organizations and worked closely with them in promoting and implementing the amnesty. This too contributed to the success of the
program.
In the United States, the INS made a genuine effort to reach ethnic
and community organizations and enlist the help of many of them as
QDEs.308 6 Initial hopes were high that this would contribute to a successful program. Since the beginning of the program, however, the INS
and the QDEs have spent too much time bickering and exchanging accusations instead of cooperating.307 This belligerent atmosphere has
done nothing but endanger the program. It has added confusion to an
already confusing situation and has contributed to many aliens not
coming forward.
Given these and other problems, Congress should approve the pending bills that seek to extend the application period for the amnesty beyond May 4, 1988.308 An extension is the only way to enhance the likelihood that the amnesty will succeed. The extra time may also help
resolve some of the lingering issues. For example, the INS could correct the deficiencies in the publicity campaign. The documentation
problems as well as the tense relations between the INS and the QDEs
also may subside. Finally, the serious problem of family unity may be
resolved. Only with an extension may the amnesty achieve IRCA's goal
of bringing millions of persons out of the shadows and solving the illegal immigration problem in the United States.

aliens).
305. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text (discussing the cooperative

atmosphere between the government, the community organizations, and others).
306. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (reviewing the selection of
QDEs by the INS and the role that the organizations were to fulfill).

307. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text (describing the tense atmosphere that exists between the INS and the QDEs).

308. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (providing the bills pending in
Congress that seek to extend the application period for legalization); Blake, Amnesty

Deadline Extension Urged, Boston Globe, Nov. 6, 1987, at 48, col. I (stating that
many are calling for an extension of the amnesty application period); Portillo, Congress
Urged to Extend Amnesty for Aliens a Year, San Diego Union, Feb. 13, 1988, at A5,
col. I (reporting that a coalition of community groups are urging Congress to extend
the application period for amnesty). But see Arocha, INS Official Criticizes Amnesty
Extension Plan, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1988, at BI1, col. 5 (quoting INS Commissioner
Alan C. Nelson as saying that the plans to extend the amnesty program are "ill-advised
and shortsighted.").

